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G R O W T H A N D T R A D E L I B E R A L I S A T I O N I N 
A V A R A N A L Y S I S 
by 
NEIL DIAS KARUNARATNE * 
1. Introduction 
The recent move towards more open trade policies in Australia, after 
decades of protection has sparked off a lively debate about its prudence 
from the standpoints of both timeliness and economic rationale. The 
proponents of open trading support the recent policy initiatives directed 
at reducing the average effective rate of protection on manufacturing from 
the current levels of about 2 0 % to about 5 % by the year 2000. Based on 
CGE (Computer General Equilibrium) model simulations it is estimated 
that liberal trade policies will lead to a permanent direct annual increase 
of 0 .5% ($1.5 billion) in GDP terms. Moreover the indirect benefits in the 
form of a reduced regressive tax burden and positive dynamic externalities 
are claimed to far outweigh these direct GDP benefits (Industry Com-
mission, 1991, p. 2). Several commissioned reports strongly support the 
push towards openness and contend that the Australian economy has 
stagnated in the past because of its inward looking policies. Conversely, the 
North-East Asian economies have made spectacular progress by pursuing 
open or export oriented trade policies (Garnaut, 1989; Hughes, 1989). The 
deregulation of the financial markets and the floating of the Australian 
dollar in 1983 has also exposed the deep seated structural malaise and an 
uncompetitive manufacturing sector bequeathed by the legacy of past protec-
tion. In its halcyon days protection to manufacturing industries drew support 
from the need to diversify the economic base and encourage European 
immigration by offering high real wages. The Brigden report (1929) captur-
* Department of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Qld. (Australia). 
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ed the rationale for protection and gave it an air of respectability through 
the celebrated Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem. 
Australia's legacy of protection runs counter to the dominant message 
of the pure theory of international trade. Pure theory emphasises cogently 
that free trade or openness would maximise national and global welfare. 
Any restrictions of trade are shown to be Pareto inefficient or sub optimal. 
Partial equilibrium analysis shows that protection in a small country or a 
price taker such as Australia would result in national welfare losses due to 
production and consumption inefficiencies. These are depicted by the H e -
berger triangles (areas b and d, Figure 1). Proponents of openness in trade 
argue that besides the static welfare losses, protection would undermine 
positive externalities and dynamic benefits of free trade. Their arguments 
run as follows: (1) Protection drives a wedge between domestic and interna-
tional prices and misaligns the exchange rate causing economy wide misallo-
cation of resources. (2) Protection by insulating the domestic economy from 
the winds of competition weakens the pressure to adopt best practice tech-
nology, quality control, management techniques and work techniques. In this 
regard the manifest uncompetitiveness in the TCF (Textile, Clothing and 
Footwear) and PMV (Passenger Motor Vehicle) industries of Australia has 
been blamed on the legacy of protection. (3) More openness is argued to 
confer economies of scale by enabling production for a larger world market 
rather than a narrow domestic market. (4) Protection puts a premium on 
rent-seeking lobbying to perpetuate protection rather than invest in R&D to 
promote innovation. (5) Protection, from a general equilibrium perspective 
blunts the competitive edge of the productive industries by making interme-
diate inputs costly and by distorting the incentive structure m the economy. 
Accordingly, the proponents of openness advocate the expeditious disman-
tling of protection or the establishment of a "level playing field" so as to 
allow the invisible hand or market forces to be the prime movers of resource 
allocation and growth in the Australian economy. 
The opponents of openness or "the level playing field" argue that these 
policies are based on unrealistic neoclassical theory as expounded in the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model and its associated theorems. They further contend 
that support for export orientation vis-a-vis import substitution is based on 
two-sector models (Bhagwati, 1988) that are congenitally biased against 
strategic trade policies. It has been demonstrated recently that even a three 
sector generalisation refutes the bipolar policy prescriptions that favour 
export promotion policies vis-a-vis strategic trade policies as pursued by 
some North-east Asian economies (Liang, 1992). Strategic trade policies 
emphasise that comparative advantage depends on economies of scale, 
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product differentiation and market imperfections and these are not endowed 
by nature but rather have to be created by interventionist policies (Krugman, 
1986). 
A game-theoretic version of strategic trade policy illustrates that target-
ing domestic firms by providing them with government subsidies can deter 
entry of potential rivals and' transfer oligopolistic rents from rivals to the 
domestic economy (Brander & Spencer, 1985). However, these strategic 
policies are essentially "beggar thy neighbour" policies which break down if 
rivals retaliate. Partial equilibrium analysis demonstrates that in a second 
best) world riddled with market failure, protection yielding job creation is pre-
ferable to inaction. For example, in the current context of high unemploy-
ment job creation could cause the marginal social benefits (area e, Figure 2) 
to exceed the welfare losses due to protection (areas b and d, Figure 2). 
However, it can be shown on specificity grounds that there are always 
superior alternative instruments to protection that could tackle market fail-
ure more efficiently. For example, a production subsidy would lead to a 
smaller welfare loss shown by the production inefficiency (area b) and 
would be preferable to protection which causes a greater welfare loss (sum 
of areas b and d, Figure 2). But, it can be argued that subsidies are also 
inefficient because of their perverse economy-wide effects. Therefore the 
policies to rectify market failure should be enunciated from a macro per-
,| FIG. 1. Welfare loss due to a tariff. 
Govt. gain( tariff): c 
National loss b + d 
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FIG. 2. Welfare effects of a subsidy. 
T: Tariff rate 
P1-P0(1+t) 
b: Production distortion 
<x Consumption distortion 
Sodai welfare gain 
Q Quantity 
If e > <b+d) tarif t welfare 
Subsidy -Tariff la superior as loss dis avoided. 
(Marginal Sodai Benefits) 
spective to get the prices right (neutral incentive structure and appropriate 
exchange rates) equalising marginal private and social net benefits. The 
opponents of protection observe that the case for protection and strategic 
trade theory dates back to the List-Hamilton infant industry argument. 
Infant industry protection has an economic justification according to the 
Mill-Bastable theorem if the net discounted present value of protection is 
positive However, protection once given oudives its usefulness by inflicting 
massive national welfare losses through unproductive rent seeking activities 
(Krueger 1974). The political economy of protection shows that although 
the total'national welfare loss from protection is large it is spread thinly 
among a large number of consumers who are neither sufftcxendy motivated 
nor organised to combat the scourge of protection. They suffer from a free 
rider" psychology whilst the vested interests that benefit from protection 
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are well organised and cogendy articulate the case for the perpetuation of 
protection through the' Manufacturing Council and the Trade Union lobbies 
in Australia (Pappas et al., 1990). 
The aim of this study is to review the pros and cons of trade liberalisa-
tion against the empirical results from causality testing and VAR innovation 
modelling. The introduction, Section 1, shows that plausible theoretical 
arguments support both the case for and against openness. Therefore, using 
a multivariate framework the trade growth nexus for Australia is analysed 
to examine the implications of the move towards trade liberalisation. The 
variables used for the empirical investigation are: growth of GDP (Yt), 
trade variables such as exports (Xt), imports {Mt), competitiveness or the 
terms of trade as measured by the ratio of the price of exports to imports 
(px/pm)> a n d proxies for growth of factor inputs such as capital (Kt) and 
labour (Lt). The study covers the period 1959Q3-1992Q1 and uses pub-
lished historical quarterly time-series from the Australian Bureau of Statis-
tics (ABS, 1988, 1991). The study uses the vector autoregressive (VAR) 
methodology in preference to the conventional simultaneous equation (SEM) 
framework to analyse the dynamic interactions between growth and trade 
variables. The VAR methodology is more suitable than the SEM meth-
odology because it does not require the use of an a priori theoretical frame-
work to examine the pros and cons of trade liberalisation policies. The 
remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2, reviews the re-
sults of correlation analysis, unit root tests and bivariate Granger causality 
analysis on trade and growth dynamics in Australia. Section 3 outlines the 
VAR methodology that has been applied to analyse the dynamics of the 
trade and growth interactions in the Australian economy. The sequential 
procedure to determine the optimal lag length to implement the constrained 
VAR methodology is also discussed in this section. Section 4 reports the 
results of the empirical validation of the VAR methodology. Section 5 
presents the conclusions and policy implications of the study for trade and 
growth in Australia. 
2. Correlation Analysis, Unit Root and Granger Causality Tests 
During the sample period the openness of the Australia economy meas-
ured as a ratio of exports to GDP doubled from 11% to 22%. Imports as 
a ratio of GDP also doubled. The correlation between GDP growth and 
trade growth variables (exports, imports), factor inputs (capital and labour) 
show very high coefficients of over 0.90. Only the competitiveness proxy 
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TABLE 1 
CORRELATION OF GROWTH AND TRADE VARIABLES 
Var y« X, m, k, Pt 1, 
y. 1.00 
X, 0.96 1.00 
m, 0.97 0.97 1.00 
k, 0.96 0.91 0.93 1.00 
P« 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.09 1.00 
I1' 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.89 - . 0 4 
1.00 
Real GDP. x,: Value of Exports. pt: Terms of Trade. kt: Capital. /,: Labour. 
failed to show a significant positive correlation with the other variables in 
the system (Table 1). These correlation results are consistent with similar 
regression results for a large number of economies at various stages of 
development. Some studies assert that trade has acted as an engine of 
growth (Michaely, 1977; Michaely et al., 1991; Salvatore and Hatcher, 
1991; Mosochos, 1989; Michalopoulos and Jay, 1973; Balassa, 1989; 
TABLE 2 
ADF UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS (« = 130) 
Log Var ADF-test min-AIC lags Q(df) I 
lnyt -1 .94 -557.79 4 1.26(2) 
lnx, -2 .91 -337.83 4 5.87(2) 
lnmt -1 .32 -336.31 5 3.39(2) 
lnp, -2 .07 -372.60 8 8.48(4) 
Ink, -2 .05 -514.85 8 4.85(4) 
Ini, -1 .85 -527.26 5 4.46(1) 
a= .05 -2 .89 X ^ . 9 9 I 
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Tyler, 1981; Feder, 1983; Kavoussi, 1984). However, the time-series 
studies referred to above are econometrically flawed because they are not 
based on stationary series and- the cross-section studies assume invariant 
parameters across countries. Nonstationarity in time-series data can lead to 
spurious correlation and regression results (Engle and Granger, 1987) and 
also the simple correlations fail to provide insights on the direction and 
strength of causalities (Granger, 1980). 
As a prelude to the application of Granger causality analysis and the 
VAR methodology each of the six variables in the system were tested for 
stationarity using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (1989) (ADF) unit root 
test. The ADF test results indicate that all the log transformed variables are 
non-stationary or are integrated order 1(1). Also all except the variable pt 
have white noise residuals according to the Ljung-Box Q statistic (Table 2). 
Therefore, they have been log-differenced to induce stationarity and convert 
them to integrated order zero 1(0) or stationary variables. 
The direction of causality between two variables could be tested using 
the Granger causality tests. A variable Xt is defined to Granger cause a 
variable Yt, notated Xt => Yt, if the prediction of the value of Yt based on 
its own history can be improved by using the history of Xt (Granger, 1969). 
The past values of Xt Granger cause Yt if the F-test for the past Xt values 
are jointly significant (this is asymptotically equivalent to a log-likelihood 
ratio test). The thirty results for the bivariate Granger causality tests are 
reported in Table 3. 
Studies for economies such as Canada, Austria, UK and USA (Eshafa-
hani, 1991; Kunst and Marin, 1989; Sharma et al., 1991) fail to support 
the hypothesis that exports act as an engine of growth in those countries. 
Cross sectional studies for developing countries also fail to lend conclusive 
support to the export causing growth hypothesis (Jung and Marshall, 1985). 
But, studies for the newly industrialised countries (NICs) confirm that 
exports cause growth and growth causes exports indicating that there are 
significant feedback effects between trade and growth (Chow, 1987). 
The bivariate Granger causality tests for Australian data reject the null 
hypothesis that exports did not cause growth of GDP during the review 
period (Table 3). Besides, the Granger tests reveal that capital formation and 
labour inputs had significant uni-directional causal effects on the growth of 
GDP. The null that terms of trade do not Granger cause exports and 
imports is also rejected indicating that Australia's trade performance is sus-
ceptible to the fluctuations in the terms of trade. The terms of trade are a 
proxy for competitiveness because they have a stable relationship with the 
real exchange rate during the review period (Blundell-Wignall and Gregory, 
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TABLE 3 
B I V A R I A T E G R A N G E R C A U S A L I T Y T E S T S 
I Null Ho: F(df) Null Ho: F(df) 
i P => Y 2.35 (1,108) L => X 1.13 (2,110) 
K => Y 5.41' (3,108) P = > X 3.22*(1,110) 
X => Y 6.87' (1,108) K => X 0.59 (1,110) 
L => Y 3.82' (1,108) M => X 1.30 (1,110) 
M => Y 0.29 (1,108) Y => X 0.69 (1,110) 
K => M 1.43 (2,101) M => P 2.36 (1,111) 
X => M 1.40 (4,101) X => P 0.05 (1,111) 
P => M 6.09' (1,101) K => P 0.22 (1,111) 
W => M 0.59 (2,101) L => P 0.54 (1,111) 
Y => M 0.99 (2,101) Y => P 0.46 (1,111) 
P => K 2.47 (2,104) X => L 3.33*(1,111) 
Y => K 3.82' (1,104) Y => L 0.08 (1,111) 
L => K 3.40* (1,104) M => L 0.22 (1,111) 
X => K 0.01 (1,104) P => L 0.01 (1,111) 
M => K 0.86 (2,104) K => L 0.91 (1,111) 
* A critical value of 3 (approximately 5 % level of significance) has been used for 
rejection of no causality null. 
1990) Growth of GDP appears to have caused variations of inputs such as 
capital and labour as hypothesised in the accelerator model Samuelson, 
1939) rather than the neoclassical growth accounting model (bolow, 197/). 
These uni-directional causal effects, notated by =>, are summarised in 
column (1) Table 4. The indirect causality occurs through a process ol 
transitivity. If x causes y and y causes Z, then * causes z indirectly and is 
notated as x->Z. The Granger causality tests indicate that exports indirect y 
caused capital formation through growth and competitiveness caused growth 
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TABLE 4 


















X, p«=>x, x,=>k, via yt 
mt pt=>m, 
Pt P.=>y. via x t 
X yt=>k, y.<=>k, 
1, 1,=>X, i lt=>yt via xt 
through exports (Col. 2, Table 4). Finally, the Granger tests also indicate bi-
directional causality or feedback effects between growth and capital forma-
tion and these symbiotics are notated as y O k (Col. 3, Table 4). 
3. VAR and Optimal Lag Length Determination Methodology 
The Granger bivariate causality tests indicate the direction of causality 
between two variables. However, to gain insights on the degree of strength 
and causal interactions between trade and growth variables it is necessary to 
use a multivariate framework. The conventional approach for multivariate 
analysis is based on the Cowles Commission's simultaneous equation models 
(SEM) (Goldberger, 1964; Johnston, 1984; Judge et al, 1985). However, 
the SEM approach has been criticised on several grounds. First, it imposes 
incredible zero restrictions based on the econometrician's judgement to a-
chieve identification of the model equations. Second, variables are dichoto-
mised into endogenous and dynamically independent exogenous in an arbitra-
ry manner. Third, the inclusion of expectation variables creates identification 
problems. The alternative to SEM favoured for this empirical analysis is the 
vector autoregression or the VAR methodology (Sims, 1980; Bernanke, 
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1986) which overcomes the deficiencies listed above. VAR appears to 
qualify for the empirical analysis of the trade growth controversy in the 
Australian context as it is atheoretic by nature. Therefore, the VAR meth-
odology allows the empirics to reveal the dynamics that govern the trade 
growth nexus in Australia untrammelled by preconceived theory. 
The implementation of the VAR methodology is predicated on the 
use of covariance stationary processes. For the empirical analysis of the 
trade growth dynamics a six I component vector is defined: z (t) = {yt, xt, 
mt, pt, kt, /,). Each component defines a covariance stationary process. 
The matrix representation of the general VAR model using the matrix 
polynomial A (L) takes the following form: 
A (L) z (t) = U (t) (1) 
where A (L) = / - AXL - A2L2 - ... - A¿} and L is the lag operator such 
that Lkz = and I is an identity matrix. Each parameter matrix A,-, 
i = 1, 2, . . , k, has dimension 6 x 6 . U (t) is vector of (errors). However, 
the parameters estimated from model (1) defy succinct interpretation and 
are difficult to understand from a theoretical viewpoint (Sims, 1980). The 
way out of this impasse is through the conversion of the VAR model (1) 
into an equivalent moving average (MA) reduced when invertibility condi-
tions hold (Granger and Newbold, 1977) as shown below: 
z(t) = A~1(L)U(f) = B(L)V(t) (2) 
The covariance matrix of the reduced form Z = V (t) V (/)' is contempora-
neously correlated and intertemporally uncorrelated. The process orthogonal-
isation overcomes the above problem by defining a triangular matrix P 
with unit diagonal so that PIP' becomes a diagonal matrix with white noise 
processes PV (t) (Judge et al, 1985). The elements of the orthogonalised 
covariance matrix of the reduced form disturbances play a crucial role in the 
identification and estimation of the VAR model. The matrix polynomial 
B (L) defines the impulse response matrix and its coefficients measure the 
dynamic response of endogenous variables z(t) consequent upon a unit 
change in innovations (measured by one standard deviation) emanating from 
a specified endogenous variable (Sims, 1982). The triangularised innovation 
matrix traces out in a recursive Wald causal chain the shock movements 
(Todd, 1990). The VAR system after orthogonalising can be stylised as: 
z{t) = B(L)V(t) (3) 
This study has used RATS software which uses the Choleski factorisation 
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technique to orthogonalise the variance covariance matrix based on V (t). 
Furthermore the representation (3) facilitates the decomposition of the 
(k 1) steps ahead FEV (forecast error variance) associated with each 
endogenous variable. The total innovations generated by an endogenous 
variable on itself and other variables in the system can be regarded as 
proportional to the FEV. These FEVs describe fundamental economic 
forces, orthogonal by construct, that cause the endogenous variables z (t) 
in the system to shift over time (Myers et al, 1990). 
This study uses the constrained VAR methodology for the empirical 
analysis of the interactions between growth and trade variables in Australia. 
The minimum Akaike (1970) Information Criterion (AIC) has been used in 
several studies to choose the optimal lag length of the polynomials in B (L) 
(Judge et al, 1985; Cheung et al, 1991; Sharma et al, 1991; Darrat, 
1988). The AIC criterion achieves an optimal trade-off between the risks 
of imposing a shorter lag and a longer lag with a larger variance (Hsiao, 
1981). The procedure of lag length restriction was initiated by pre-specifying 
a lag length of 12 periods for each variable. Having determined the optimal 
own lag length using the minimum AIC criterion and the Ljung-Box Q 
statistic for white noise residuals, the remaining variables in the system 
were added sequentially using the specific gravity criterion (Caines et al, 
1981). The VAR analysis is extremely sensitive to the order in which var-
iables are incorporated in the polynomials. The maximum value of the 
specific gravity criterion (or the reciprocal of the minimum AIC) specifies 
the next variable that qualifies for inclusion in the bivariate polynomial 
relationship. The optimal lag length of included variables are determined 
on the basis of the AIC criterion. The above sequential procedure can be 
extended to the «-variate plynomials to select optimal lag lengths until the 
VAR system is fully specified. 
4. Results of Validation of VAR Model 
The VAR polynomials are all expressed in terms of stationary vari-
ables. Stationarity for the time series variables used in the study was a-
chieved by taking the four period log differences of the quarterly data. The 
data used for growth, trade and factor inputs in the vector z (t) were all 
obtained from published Australian Bureau of Statistics historical time-series 
(ABS, 1988, 1991). The optimal lag lengths of the polynomials were de-
rived using the sequential procedure enunciated by Hsiao (1981). The 
polynomials for the restricted VAR model for growth, exports, imports, 
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terms of trade or competitiveness, factor inputs capital and labour are re-
ported in Table 5. The constrained VAR model with optimal lag lengths 
denoted by superscripts has the general form from the restricted model: 
B (L) z (t) = V (t). 
The expanded form of the constrained VAR is reported in Table 5. 
The parameter estimates associated with the variables in the VAR model are 
misleading (Sims, 1980) and therefore they are not reported. 
The above specification of the constrained VAR model was used to 
determine the causal strengths amongst the growth and trade variables. For 
this purpose the behaviour of innovations generated by each variable was 
analysed using variance decompositions obtained through FEVs. 
The FEVs were calculated by the Choleski factorisation method using 
the RATs computer algorithm (Doan, 1989). The variance decomposition 
divides the forecast error variance (FEV) of a given variable according to 
the causal strength of the innovation effects of the variable on itself and 
other variables in the system. An optimal forecast occurs when the highest 
amount of innovations by the variable is accounted for by itself. The magni-
tude of the FEV provides an estimate of the Granger causal strength of the 
innovating variable on other variables in the VAR system (Sims, 1980; 
1982). For the purpose of this empirical analysis the strength of the causal 
effects have been classified on a percentage basis into low, medium and 
high. Variance decomposition for 12 and 24 periods ahead forecasts were 
calculated to capture the full dynamics of the trade and growth nexus that 
operated in the Australian economic system and the results are reported in 
Table 6. 
The variance decompositions indicate that innovations in growth are 
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TABLE 6 
DECOMPOSITION OF FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE (FEV) 
STRENGTH OF CAUSALITY 
Lag yt X, m, P. K 
1, 
12 y, 90.25 0.27 1.33 0.44 7.30 0.41 
24 93.53 0.16 0.81 0.43 5.05 0.12 
High Low Low Low Medium Low 
12 X, 3.33 87.72 7.93 0.06 0.24 0.81 
12 m, 1.70 16.30 79.82 0.08 1.27 0.83 
24 6.09 20.96 68.65 0.15 1.18 2.97 
Medium Medium High Low Low Low 
12 p, 0.02 0.09 0.53 99.28 0.04 0.04 
24 0.08 0.18 0.54 99.11 0.05 0.05 
Low Low Low High Low Low 
12 k, 24.24 0.64 11.00 0.21 63.89 0.02 
24 35.63 1.25 8.87 0.22 54.00 0.03 
High Low Medium Low High Low 
12 1, 27.28 7.26 0.37 0.34 0.94 63.81 
24 51.13 13.54 0.99 0.99 0.58 33.44 
High Medium Low Low Low High 
Classification of the strength of causality. 
0 < 5%: Low causality. 
5 - 3 0 % : Medium causality. 
3 0 % > : High causality. 
explained by more than 93% of its own FEV. GDP growth innovations 
have only a low causal effect on the growth of exports accounting for only 
3 % of its FEV. However, GDP growth innovations appear to have high 
causal effects on factor inputs such as capital formation and labour account-
ing for more than 35% and 51% of their FEVs, respectively. The GDP 
growth effects on capital formation are consistent with the accelerator 
principle (Samuelson, 1939). Innovations in growth appear to have an un-
usually high causal leverage on labour. Accordingly we could conjecture 
that a growth recession would cause a severe downturn in labour inputs. 
The causal effects of export growth on GDP growth appear to be surpris-
ingly low during the review period. They account for only 0.16% of the 
GDP growth FEV. Nearly 85% of innovations of the export growth is 
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explained by its own FEV. Export growth innovations had only medium 
level causal effects on both imports and labour inputs accounting for about 
21% and 14% of the FEV respectively. The causal effects of innovations 
in exports on growth, capital formation and the competitiveness are revealed 
to be very low. Innovations in imports accounted for nearly 69% of its 
own FEV and had medium level causal impacts on exports and capital 
formation accounting for nearly 9 % of the FEV of each of them. The 
innovations of the competitiveness proxy accounted for more than 99% of 
its own FEV and had very low causal effects on other endogenous variables 
in the system. Innovations in capital formation accounted for 54% of its 
own FEV and had medium level causal effects on growth as it accounted 
for more than 5 % of the growth FEV. Capital formation had low causal 
effects on other variables in the system. Innovations in labour inputs 
accounted for more than 33% of its own FEV and had very low causal 
effects on other system variables accounting for a very low percentage of 
their FEVs (Table 6). 
The variance decomposition analysis clearly shows that during the 
review period exports were a very sluggish engine of growth. Besides, the 
reverse causality of growth acting as stimulus for exports was also very 
weak and therefore the perceived feedback effects or symbiotics between 
exports and growth were very fragile during the study period. Overall the 
results support the claims by the proponents of active trade liberalisation 
that protracted protection had created a structural malaise that undermines 
the performance of the Australian economy. The neoclassical growth account-
ing model that posits that factor inputs such as capital and labour cause 
growth appears to receive support during the review period. 
5. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
The VAR empirical results reveal that' weak causalities and dismal 
dynamics undermined GDP growth and trade performance of the Australian 
economy during the review period. The advocates of trade liberalisation 
have blamed the protectionist legacy for these dismal dynamics and have 
emphasised the need for rapid trade reform to capture the magic of trade led 
growth as enjoyed by the North-east Asian economies. However, given 
Australia's poor trade growth dynamics it is necessary to be cautious about 
the responsiveness of economic growth to trade liberalisation policies. 
The effectiveness of trade reform can be sharpened by complementing 
it with microeconomic reforms. The One Nation Statement (Keating, 1992) 
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sets out some of the complementary microeconomic reforms that have to be 
undertaken to make the Australian economy internationally competitive. 
They include: 1. Infrastructure upgrading (ports, aviation, roads). 2. Remov-
al of labour market rigidities caused by outmoded work practices and rent 
seeking behaviour of unions. 3. Tax reform so as to remove the disincen-
tives on investment and innovations geared to trade. 4. The removal of 
institutional bottlenecks, administrative delays and bureaucratic inertia. 
In the current environment of macroeconomic instability as evidenced 
by the record unemployment rate of over 11%, the burgeoning current 
account and fiscal deficit, trade liberalisation is likely to have adverse transi-
tory adjustment effects on both the unemployment rate and the twin defi-
cits. In the past official reports recommended that trade reforms should be 
postponed or slowed down during periods of macroeconomic instability 
(Jackson et a l , 1975; Crawford et al , 1979). However, international expe-
rience indicates that successful trade reform and macrostabilisation can pro-
ceed in tandem (Krueger, 1990). Moreover, countries that have pursued 
vigorous trade reform programs have been more successful in generating 
sufficient growth (Dornbusch, 1992). Steadfast trade reforming countries 
have generated sufficient revenue to overcome the twin deficits more effec-
tively than countries that have prevaricated on trade liberalisation (Thomas 
and Nash, 1991). Nevertheless, international experience suggests that the 
magic of trade reform should not be oversold because of its asymmetric 
growth effects. The lack lustre performance of trade liberalisation policies 
in the short-run can lead to disenchantment and undermine the credibility 
of reform policies (Rodrik, 1992). Openness in trade provides at best an 
environment enabling to nurture international competitiveness provided 
macroeconomic instability is not a major stumbling block. 
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CRESCITA E LIBERALIZZAZIONE DEL COMMERCIO IN AUSTRALIA. 
UNA ANALISI VAR 
Questo articolo cerca di chiarire la controversia sulla liberalizzazione del 
commercio in Australia analizzando empiricamente la dinamica della crescita del 
commercio per il periodo campione 1959-III 1992-1 usando un modello VAR. Si 
fa inoltre una analisi di correlazione e si presentano dei test Granger per determi-
nare la direzione della causalità. I risultati empirici indicano che la performance 
economica dell'Australia è stata viziata da deboli rapporti causali tra commercio 
e crescita nel periodo in esame. Questo sembra mostrare l'opportunità di una ra-
pida riforma del commercio. Ma la debole dinamica insita nell'economia austra-
liana e gli effetti asimmetrici di politiche di apertura sulla crescita non lasciano 
spazio all'ottimismo. Sono indispensabili riforme microeconomiche complementa-
ri perché le riforme del commercio abbiano un impatto significativo sulla cresci-
ta economica. Nel breve periodo i costi di aggiustamento della liberalizzazione 
del commercio possono comportare instabilità macroeconomica in una economia 
che già soffre per la debole dinamica di crescita commerciale. Perciò il mito della 
liberalizzazione del commercio non deve essere eccessivamente sbandierato per-
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Today the standards of living of most countries in sub-Saharan African 
have fallen below the levels that prevailed when they achieved independ-
ence in the 1960's. Their combined GDP of $150 billion for over 500 
million people is about the same as that of Belgium with its population of 
only 10 million. It is not surprising that by the summer of 1990 many 
observers viewed the condition of these nations as desperate. Between 1980 
and 1989, sub-Saharan Africa's performance was the worst in the Third 
World with real GDP per capita declining 1.2 percent per year on the aver-
age. The situation is especially deplorable in agriculture where Africa was 
once a net exporter of food. Recendy, production per capita of agricultural 
products has been falling in most countries in the sub-Saharan region and 
starvation is only averted by massive food imports \ Production is 20 
percent below the level achieved in 1970 although population has doubled 
in the intervening years. What is more even with protracted foreign aid, the 
situation is becoming worse. 
Causes of Africa's Decline. - Many factors explain the decline in food 
output as well as overall production. Obviously, war is one. Another is 
corruption and incompetence of public officials 2. The Berg report pointed 
out that nationalist feelings at the time independence was achieved and a 
lack of private capital induced an excessive growth of public sector enter-
prises which took on responsibilities they were unable to manage effective-
ly 3. Droughts also played a devastating role. In some parts of Zimbabwe, 
* University of Cincinnati, Department of Economics, Cincinnati, OH (U.S.A.). 
1 AYITTY ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
2 WORLD BANK ( 1 9 8 1 ) . 
5 Ibid. 
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for example, not even grass grew for over a year. But natural and manmade 
disasters have not been confined to Africa. They have also been experienced 
in both eastern and southern Asia where GDP per capita grew by 6.2 
percent and 3 percent respectively from 1980 to 1989. Only in Africa has 
the hardship increased as food output along with GDP per capita declined. 
As the World Bank has recognized, while war, drought and the oil crises 
account for part of the difference, the primary cause of Africa's economic 
distress was misconceived economic policies. Rather than improving and 
diversifying the agricultural sector they tried to industrialize at a time when 
much of the world already was moving toward a post-industrial stage. The 
result can be seen in many "castles in the desert" 4. Massive food imports 
consequently became unavoidable. 
Our concern here focuses on two factors: the way the prices of food 
are determined in sub-Saharan Africa, and the conditions under which the 
importation of food into sub-Saharan Africa takes place. We seek to learn 
the role they have played and may be playing in the worsening of the food 
production crisis as well as the acceleration of general economic decline. 
Artificially Low Food Prices. - A particularly harmful practice of many 
Socialist regimes in Africa was the imposition of very low price ceilings on 
farm products to appease urban populations. This, however, usually made 
agriculture so unprofitable that many farmers left their farms and migrated 
to already overcrowded cities The folly of this practice was recently de-
monstrated in Kenya where the government maintained artificially low 
prices on cereals while allowing fertilizer costs to skyrocket. As a result, 
many farmers are not planting maize and wheat6. Zambia had a similar 
experience. The Kaunda regime there, to appease urban areas, also kept 
food prices abnormally low. This both depressed food production in the 
countryside and encouraged rural residents to come to the cities. The popula-
tion of Lusaka increased ten-fold as a result7. This type of foolish policy 
was unfortunately widespread. 
Giving Away Food. - In 1990, 2.7 million tons of food aid was 
provided to sub-Saharan Africa. About half was handed out free. It is 
estimated that 30.5 percent of the total was emergency aid, of which 15.9 
percent went to refugees and 3.7 percent was given to vulnerable groups 8. 
When widespread starvation looms, there are no alternatives to handouts. 
4 WORLD BANK ( 1 9 8 9 a ) . 
' WORLD BANK ( 1 9 8 9 b ) . 
6 Miami Herald (1993). 
7 MORROW ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
8 I . M . F . ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
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The viçtims of civil war in southern Sudan and Angola as well as Mozambi-
que and Somalia are all cases in point. Although most experts agree that un-
conditional gifts should be limited to extreme conditions, practical considera-
tions make restricting their use difficult. In addition, there is a significant 
lag between the widespread perception of the need and the subsequent 
delivery of food. Frequently, therefore, the real emergency has already 
passed before food distribution begins. This can damage the markets for 
domestic farm products thereby hurting local farmers, and reducing future 
production capabilities. It may also make local governments and populations 
dependent. This happened in both western Sudan and northern Ethiopia in 
1985 9. 
Substantial donations of free food frequently stem from the domestic 
problems of food donors rather than charitable motivation. Agricultural 
producing nations often have elaborate systems of subsidies and controls 
which frequently lead to the buildup of large surpluses. The European 
Community's CAP, common agricultural policy, as well as the price sup-
ports and resultant surpluses of the U.S. Department of Agriculture are 
obvious cases where official generosity is motivated in part by the desire to 
dispose of excess supplies. Unrestricted free food shipments to dependent 
areas provide an opportunity to appear altruistic while unloading surplus 
crops. 
Dumping. — Closely related to overly generous give-away programs is 
the practice of selling surplus food products to poor African nations at 
artificially low prices. The injury inflicted on African producers is of the 
same nature and can be as severe as that which results from excessive gifts 
of free food. It is paradoxical that at the same time that the European 
Community is spending more than $9 billion per year on programs to help 
Africa both feed and develop itself, such destructive counter initiatives are 
allowed to go on 10. 
A case in point is the dumping of EC beef on West Africa. The beef 
in question is fatty and not prized by European buyers. It is, however, 
accepted by Africa's hungry consumers. This beef is very profitable for 
farmers in the EC because subsidies are based on fat content. The program 
although ostensibly justified by African poverty is really designed to ad-
vance the interests of rich European farmers. Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, 
where most of the beef is dumped, are not major catde producers but 
normally obtain their supplies from farmers in Chad, Sahel and Burkino 
' The Economist (1993b). 
10 KILLICK (1986) . 
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Faso Most farmers in these areas have given up attempting to sell in their 
former markets because beef dumped by the EC brings such low prices. 
European beef costs less than half that produced in Sahel-Mali. For ex-
ample, a good cut of French beef in Abidjan sells for about $2 a pound 
while'the same cut produced in Sahel costs $5. Live catde from Sahel, 
which accounted for two-thirds of the beef consumed in the Ivory Coast in 
1975, by 1990 amounted to only 25 percent of the total. European beef 
exports to the Ivory Coast increased about seven-fold over this period. 
. African farmers are in reality the victims of systematic over production of 
food in the EC, which is subsidized by Europe's taxpayers to benefit the 
politically strategic farm lobby. To add to the paradox, the EC is spending 
substantial sums to support the very cattle farmers the dumping injures. It 
is even harder to justify because this very harmful policy from Africa's point 
of view is providing a market for a very small part, less than .5 percent, of 
Europe's beef production11. Paradoxically, no African government has 
mounted serious opposition to this policy. 
Conditions Tied to Gifts. - The conditions under which aid is extended 
can also influence the benefits provided. At present, about half of the cash 
contributions require that the funds be expended on the products or services 
of the country making the gift. Since the goods or services involved are 
frequendy priced above competitive levels, recipient countries regularly lose 
from 15 to 20 percent of the value of the gifts. 
The pattern of aid distribution among developing countries and areas 
also often produces odd results. For example, the richest 40 percent of the 
population receives more than twice the aid per capita as the poorest 40 
percent. Those with the worst population problems seemed to receive the 
least aid 12. In addition, nations that spend most aid on the military get 
more per head than those that devote the most of their gifts to social 
welfare 13. .. 
It is clear that the way gifts are distributed can have important ettects, 
both good and evil, for the recipient country. Mishandling of food distribu-
tion can often negate the beneficial influence of other development pro-
grams. There are important advantages to be realized from coordinating and 
rationalizing the various efforts being made by a donor in a developing area. 
Trade policies also should be evaluated for the role they may play in the 
overall African assistance programs. Only in this way can self-defeating, 
conflicting policies be avoided. 
11 The Economist (1993c). 
12 COCHRANE and FAIRD ( 1 9 8 9 ) . 
" The Economist (1993d). 
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Clearly, >the distribution of aid among recipient nations should be 
based significantly on need. Nations that can and are attracting significant 
private capital need less and ought to get less external funds. Tying gifts to 
the purchase of donor nations' goods should be avoided. Projects must be 
selected for their real substantive value not as showpieces. Where food must 
be given, the following arrangements may be useful. 
Market Sales. - One way to deal with this problem is to sell food on 
local markets and use the funds generated thereby for developmental ven-
tures. This can work fairly well if the quantity sold is limited so that prices 
are not unduly depressed and resultant damage to the local agricultural 
economy is minimal. Over one-third of Africa's food assistance of 2.7 mil-
lion tons in 1990 was distributed in this way. 
Food-for-Work. - This approach has the advantage of avoiding the 
development of dependence on foreign aid by local populations. Care must 
be taken that the really needy can perform the tasks involved. Otherwise, 
those who are most robust and least need food will be the primary benefi-
ciaries. In coping with last year's drought in Zimbabwe, Food-for-Work was 
used to motivate the people to prepare for the next planting time by under-
taking light infrastructure projects. Seed and food packets passed out as part 
of the program enabled half of Zimbabwe's population to survive and pro-
vided enough seed to plant the next crop 14. With Food-for-Work projects, 
care also must be taken to avoid so much food importation that local farm 
markets would be flooded. 
Eritrea's transitional government used Food-for-Work programs to start 
rebuilding the country on its own. They put most citizens to work digging 
small dams to trap rainfall, planting trees and building terraces in return for 
basic rations of cooking oil and grain. The country's soldiers built roads for 
their rations. These efforts so far have been a success 15. 
Cash Distribution. - When this is employed, the local agricultural 
economy is uninjured and food is distributed through normal market chan-
nels. Also, cash can be disbursed more quickly than food products. Clearly, 
the advantages are most fully realized in economies where free markets exist 
and food is readily available. It fails to meet the needs of more primitive 
societies where markets are functioning poorly or subject to more complete 
regulation. Further, it would not meet the need when food shortages are so 
serious that ample grain is not available locally. Botswana has been able to 
use this approach because of its well-developed market system. Obviously, 
14 LARCH (1993). 
" The Economist (1993a). 
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this formula does not appeal to donors bent on dumping domestic surpluses. 
Certainly cash distributions place a heavier burden on donor nations in most 
instances. Rather than unloading surpluses that do not have ready markets, 
budget allocations of scarce funds must be made. Developing nations must 
be realistic and face the fact that this approach can mean a reduced quantity 
of aid. 
A number of suggestions for improving the distribution of aid have 
been made. Foremost among them is the appeal that policies be coordinated 
and not pursued in splendid isolation. This will not occur automatically and 
is unlikely to happen on donor initiative. Rather international agencies, 
especially African organizations, must actively press to bring this about. 
They must make their voices heard above the other competing interest 
groups in the EC and the U.S. Congress. Experience has shown that rigor-
ous and unrelenting diplomacy can on occasion achieve significant results 
even in Africa. Needless to say, the pricing of agricultural products must 
reflect market forces and not the desires of particular pressure groups. 
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CONTROLLO DEI PREZZI DEI PRODOTTI ALIMENTARI E POLITICHE 
D'IMPORTAZIONE NEL DECLINO DELL'AGRICOLTURA AFRICANA 
La produzione di derrate alimentari nell'Africa sub-sahariana è diminuita 
drasticamente sì da rendere necessarie massicce importazioni per evitare che la 
sua crescente popolazione muoia di fame. In alcuni paesi, prezzi controllati ecces-
sivamente bassi hanno provocato questo declino. In altri, il dumping dei prodot-
ti alimentari da parte dei paesi sviluppati, sopratutto della Comunità Europea, 
hanno fatto perdere ai produttori africani i loro mercati. Doni di prodotti alimen-
tari hanno pure ridotto la capacità dell'Africa di essere autosufficiente. È neces-
sario che si eliminino i controlli sui prezzi e che vengano esercitate pressioni 
politiche perché cessi il dumping. Sono pure necessarie misure affinché agli aiuti 
alimentari corrispondano prestazioni lavorative e le derrate importate vengano 
vendute sui mercati africani. 
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G R O W T H , E F F I C I E N C Y A N D R E F O R M 
I N C H I N E S E I N D U S T R Y : R E V I E W A N D A S S E S S M : 
by 
YANRUI WU * 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between growth and efficiency is a subject of continu-
ing interest. It is argued that China achieved respectable growth rates in the 
last decades but the economic gains came at a very high cost in terms of 
investment and labour input (World Bank, 1990b). In other words, indus-
trialization in China has been based mainly on a massive infusion of central-
ly mobilized resources, with little concern for efficiency (Meier, 1989). 
Lack of efficiency has been a major constraint to the further growth of the 
economy. The principal objective of the economic reform of the 1980s is to 
improve on past growth performance and to do so largely through an in-
crease in efficiency. 
This paper reviews and assesses some key issues relating to industrial 
growth, efficiency and reform in China. Section 2 presents a brief review of 
industrial development over the last decades. The growth of rural industry 
in recent years is highlighted as well. Section 3 explores the issues asso-
ciated with industrial growth and efficiency in the context of international 
comparisons. Section 4 summarizes some key policy changes of the reform 
and their relation to efficiency performance in the industrial sector. Section 
5 elaborates the changes in the production pattern since the inception of the 
reform and the remaining problems in the post-reform period. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 concludes the paper. 
* Department of Economics, University of Otago, Dunedin (New Zealand). 
Work on this paper was partly completed while the author was with the Chinese Economy 
Research Unit, University of Adelaide. The author would like to thank Christopher Findlay 
for his valuable comments and suggestions on early drafts. 
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2. Industrial Growth in China 
Growth over the Last Forty Years. - China, though large, has been predom-
inantly a rural society for a long time. In 1953, for instance, the industrial 
sector only generated about 19 percent of the gross domestic products 
(GDP) in the economy, in comparison with the agricultural sector's 68 
percent (H. Wu, 1993). China has been active in developing a modern 
industrial sector. The development program started following the 1949 
revolution. As a result, economic recovery and industrial development were 
rapid during the early 1950s which basically covered the period of the first 
Five Year Plan (1953-1957). During this period, a system of national 
economic planning was established which almost exactly mirrored the Soviet 
model (Lardy, 1978). In this model, price fixing, resource allocation and 
investment decision-making were all in the hands of state bodies, while 
the enterprises received increasingly detailed production plans. The whole 
process of industrial administration became extremely centralized and 
bureaucratic, with less and less scope for market forces to operate within 
the system. 
While the success of the first Five Year Plan (FYP) laid a solid 
foundation for subsequent development, economic planning was about to be 
swept aside by a wave of absurdly over-optimistic projections and policies 
following the Great Leap Forward (GLF) movement of 1958. The Great 
Leap Forward, an attempt to accelerate economic development by achieving 
a massive rise simultaneously in grain, rural and urban industrial outputs, 
caused extensive resource dislocation in the economy (Feuchtwang, Hussain 
and Pairault, 1988). Although it had some success, the result of the move-
ment was an industrial stagnation as well as a major economic recession 
during the period of 1958-1962. Industrial income (GDP), for example, 
only achieved an average growth rate of 4.9 percent per annum during this 
period, in comparison with 14.2 percent during the first Five Year Plan 
period. Meanwhile, the gross domestic product of the whole economy on an 
average had a negative growth rate of 3.4 percent during the same period 
Not surprisingly, the early 1960s were years of industrial consolidation 
and recovery. During the three years of 1963-1965, industrial GDP had 
been growing at an average rate of 18 percent per annum (H. Wu, 1993). 
But in 1966 Mao launched the Cultural Revolution (CR). Industrial devel-
opment was disrupted and slowed down once again. During the ten years of 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), industrial income (GDP) actually had 
' These growth rates are calculated from data estimated by H. Wu (1993). 
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negative growth rates in 1967, 1968 and 1976. It was the death of Mao in 
1976, shordy afterwards followed by the downfall of the "Gang of Four", 
that allowed the emergence of a new leadership and subsequently compre-
hensive economic reform policies. Since then, the Chinese economy as well 
as the industrial sector has been steadily growing at an average rate of about 
10 percent per annum in real terms. Today, China is a rising industrial power 
whose economy displays many features of a modern economy. Industry is 
now the largest sector in the economy in terms of output value, although 
agriculture continues to dominate in employment. 
Challenge of Rural Industry. - While promoting the construction of a mod-
ern industrial sector, China is also interested in the development of a rural 
industrial sector. Although the development program originated in the late 
1950s has been interrupted over time due to political chaos and policy 
instability, it has gradually gained wide support in the 1980s as the econom-
ic reforms deepened. Rural industry is now the fast-growing sector in the 
economy 2. For example, it has been reported that on average rural industry 
has been growing at a two-digit real rate over the last decade 3. 
Many factors contributed to the rapid growth of rural industry 4. The 
most important one is the rapid accumulation of capital in the rural sector 
during that period. The accumulation of funds for investment in the nonagri-
cultural activities was related to the unusual growth of agricultural incomes, 
which stemmed partly from the growth of agricultural production and partly 
from the increase in the purchase prices for agricultural products. This can 
be seen clearly in the amount of domestic savings in the rural sector, which 
increased from 5.57 billion yuan in 1978 to 56.48 billion yuan in 1985 
(SSB, 1991, p. 295). It was the increase in capital input that stimulated 
rural industrial growth. Furthermore, the rural-urban isolation policies 
pursued for a long time by the Chinese government prohibited rural out-mi-
gration, and therefore the large army of surplus labour that emerged after 
the agricultural reforms had to be absorbed by the rural sector itself (Y. 
Wu, 1990; and Anderson, 1990). The direct result of this policy combined 
with the easy access to investment funds is the formation of an industrial 
economy in the rural sector5. 
2 Rural industry includes all industrial enterprises run by townships, villages, individuals and 
partnerships. 
3 Both ISLAM (1991) and Y. Wu (1990) reported growth rates of about 30 percent. 
4 For survey papers about rural industrial development, see EC (1987), BYRD and LIN (1990), 
Y . W u ( 1 9 9 0 ) , FINDLAY, WATSON a n d Y . W u ( 1 9 9 4 ) e t c . 
5 The rapid growth of the rural industry can be interpreted in the framework of booming 
sector theory. For details, see Y. Wu (1990). 
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With its rapid development and increasing significance in the economy, 
rural industry is now challenging the state industrial sector which has domi-
nated the economy for nearly forty years. According to the latest statistics, 
the gross value of output (GVO) share of the rural industrial sector over 
the national industrial total increased from 11 percent in 1981 to 31 percent 
in 1991. The total employment in the rural industrial sector, on the other 
hand, increased to 58 million in 1991, which is greater than the total 
employment (45 million) in the state industry in the same year. Meanwhile 
the GVO share of the rural enterprise sector as a whole over the national 
total rose from only 8.2 percent in 1981 to 26.4 percent in 1991, and the 
employment share from 6.8 to 16.5 percent during the same period (SSB, 
1992) In 1981, the GVO of the rural enterprise sector was only about a 
third of the agricultural GVO, but in 1991 the former was 40 percent 
greater than the latter, with the first breakthrough point observed in 1987 
(SSB, 19.92, pp. 329 and 390). 
Rural enterprises have taken a major role in the development of the 
Chinese economy. Rapid industrialization in the countryside has greatly 
changed the Chinese economic structure, as a result. It seems, as some 
economists have said, that the policy "surrounding the cities from the coun-
tryside" popular in Mao's era is coming back but not in the battle field this 
time (Findlay and Watson, 1991). 
3. Growth and Efficiency in International Perspective 
Unbalanced Growth. - In the development literature, it is well-recognized 
that growth proceeds at an uneven rate from sector to sector in the transi-
tional economies (Syrquin, 1986). Historically, agriculture has often been 
instrumental in igniting growth, but eventually the leading role has shifted 
to other sectors, predominantly manufacturing. A sector is said to be a lead-
ing sector when its rate of growth exceeds the average rate for a period long 
enough to raise overall growth toward its rate and when it spreads its 
dynamism through substantial links to other sectors. However, sectoral 
interdependence imposes certain constraints which if violated may retard 
growth (Chenery et al., 1986). 
The importance of maintaining a proper balance among economic sec-
tors has been discussed by economists (e.g. Kuznets, 1966; and Meier, 
1989). The economies that have fostered the development of agriculture 
through government investment and policy guidance have better growth 
performance than those that have stimulated industry and neglected, agricul-
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ture. Israel, Malaysia and Taiwan are examples of the first group and 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay of the second (Syrquin, 1986). There is no 
doubt that China falls into the second group. This is clearly shown by 
international comparisons in Table 1 between China and other countries at 
the same stage of development as China is now. It should be emphasized 
here that these comparisons are subject to numerous conceptual and statisti-
cal problems. These problems have been discussed at length in the literature 
(e.g. World Bank, 1985b; and Chen et ah, 1988a). 
According to Table 1, the production pattern in terms of GDP shares 
is atypical in China by comparison with those in other countries. On the one 
hand the shares of agriculture and infrastructure in the total production in 
China are similar to those of other low-income countries. The share of 
manufacturing, on the other, is far larger than that of the typical low-income 
countries like India and similar to that of the typical middle-income coun-
tries due to high saving and investment in China (World Bank, 1985a). The 
share of services in output, by contrast, is much smaller than in other 
developing countries. The low output share of services reflects the limited 
role of commerce, banking and finance, and miscellaneous business and 
personal services in the Chinese economy. This also reflects the small share 
of household consumption in national income and the high degree of enter-
prise and local self-sufficiency, which reduce the provision of trade, financial 
and other business services. 
In terms of employment, the share of agriculture in China is similar to 
that of other developing countries but the composition of nonagricultural 
employment is rather different (World Bank, 1985a). Because of the low 
share of labour-intensive consumer goods within the manufacturing sector, 
the employment share of this sector is significantly lower than in the low-in-
come countries but less than its share in output. As expected, the share of 
services in employment is lower than in other developing countries. 
China as a low income country has formed an unusual pattern of 
production. Further growth is unlikely to be sustained without a balanced 
allocation of resources among the sectors. In particular, favouring industry 
at the expense of other sectors does not seem to generate rapid growth. 
Countries that have stimulated agricultural production and incomes at early 
stages of development have generally experienced faster,'rather than slower, 
industrial growth. Infrastructure and service sectors are vital for industrial 
and agricultural efficiency (Syrquin, 1986). The stagnation of the former 
sectors will eventually constrain the growth of the latter sectors as well as 
the whole economy. 
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TABLE 1 
PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES 
Production Patterns 
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NOTES and SOURCES: . 
» All data are from Tables 3.6 and 3.9, WORLD BANK (1985b); 
b 1981 data; 
1982^ data; ""OLI" represents "other low income" countries and "LMI" the "lower middle 
e ^ d T a w T i n 1980/1981 for the group of countries with GDP per head of $300; 
f 1959 data; 
8 1965 data; 
i T h ? industrial sector here includes mining, manufacturing, electricity and construction; 
i Transport and services. 
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Growth without Efficiency. — The fundamental weakness of China's econo-
my has been inefficient use of labour, capital, energy and raw materials. In 
other words, the Chinese economy has been growing for a long time with-
out efficiency. Virtually all socialist countries have now learned that central 
planning of a complex economy will not achieve either allocative efficiency 
or the full utilization of resources. The objectives of the reforms are to 
decentralize decision-making, to place more reliance on market mechanisms 
instead of administrative controls, and hence to achieve high efficiency. 
Research on the sources of growth has shown that output growth is 
rarely entirely accounted for by the increased inputs. Efficiency improve-
ment is generally a significant contributor to output growth, especially in 
most rapidly developing economies. The traditional measurement of efficien-
cy is total factor productivity which is defined as the difference between the 
rates of growth of output and of the weighted average of inputs. Table 2 
presents research findings from various sources. According to this table, the 
developed economies are characterized by little growth of labour inputs (1.1 
percent) and moderate growth of total factor inputs (2.7 percent), while the 
developing economies have high growth rates of both labour inputs (3.3 
percent) and total factor inputs (4.3 percent). However, according to the 
same table, the developed economies show a relatively large contribution of 
TFP to aggregate growth (49 percent) and the developing economies a 
relatively small contribution of TFP to aggregate growth (31 percent). Final-
ly, we observe in Table 2 that the centrally planned economies are in most 
respects closer to the developing economies than to the developed ones. The 
developing and centrally planned economies rely more heavily on expanding 
factor inputs than on increasing efficiency performance to drive growth. 
The record of efficiency improvement in China has been a poor one. 
Calculations for China suggest that total factor productivity of the industrial 
sector has been either increasing or decreasing depending on the weights 
given to labour and capital (see Table 3). The contribution of TFP to 
aggregate growth is very small over time, in particular for the pre-reform 
period. It is apparent that growth in China has been achieved mainly 
through the expansion of material inputs. Although these calculations are 
crude and suffer from numerous conceptual data problems, which are shared 
by estimates for other countries, these aggregated TFP indexes are rough 
indicators of performance. 
Furthermore, growth without efficiency in China is also very much in 
evidence in terms of material use. Table 4 presents the international compar-
isons of consumption of energy, steel and freight transport per US dollar of 
GDP. It is apparent that China's consumption of intermediate materials per 
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TABLE 2 
OUTPUT, INPUT AND TFP GROWTH RATES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES" 
Growth Rates Growth SI rares 
Countries Years Y b L K T-input
























































































































































































































NOTES and SOURCES: 
« For the sources of data, refer to CHENERY (1986); 
k Y is value-added; 
c T-input refers to total factor input; 
d T h e average is not the mean of the listed countries but of all countries in the group. 
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TABLE 3 
O U T P U T , I N P U T A N D T F P G R O W T H R A T E S I N C H I N A 
Years 
Growth Rates Contributions 
Y L K T-input TFP T-input TFP 
1952-57 21.1 13.7 7.4 64.9 35.1a 
1953-57 8.9 2.8 21.7 10.4 - 1 . 5 116.9 - 16.9b 
16.7 6.1 16.4 11.6 5.1 69.5 30.5C 
6.6 2.5 4.1 38.0 62.0d 
1957-78 8.8 6.8 9.9 8.4 0.4 95.5 4.5C 
1965-78 9.1 8.3 0.8 91.2 8.8a 
1965-76 5.1 4.5 0.6 88.2 11.8a 
1971-75 5.5 2.1 9.3 5.0 0.5 90.9 9.1b 
1976-85 8.8 5.0 3.8 56.9 43.1d 
1978-85 8.6 2.5 4.8 3.8 4.8 44.2 55.8e 
1980-88 8.5 0.3 1.5 6.1 2.4 71.7 28.3e 
1981-84 8.7 3.2 8.3 5.2 3.5 59.8 40.2b 
NOTES a n d SOURCES: 
Output (Y), labour (L), capital (K), total factor input (T-input) and total factor productivity 
(TFP) could have different definitions and measures as explained in the original references 
from which each row of data is drawn in this table. Technical notes and detailed explanations 
can be found in these references. They are: a) TIDRICK (1986); b) DERNBERGER and ECKAUS 
( 1 9 8 8 ) ; c ) CHEN e t al . ( 1 9 8 8 b ) ; d) PERKINS ( 1 9 8 8 ) ; and e ) JEFFERSON, RAWSKI and ZHENG 
(1992). 
US dollar of GDP appears high by international standards. China's steel 
consumption of 127.30 metric tons per million US dollars of GDP in 1981 
was, for example, about 30 percent higher than India's, about 10 percent 
higher than South Korea's and twice as high as Japan's. Consumption of 
energy of 2.90 kilograms of coal equivalent per US dollar of GDP in 1980 
was considerably higher than India's 1.77, more than twice as much as 
South Korea's 1.12, and almost six times as much as Japan's 0.51, according 
to Table 4. In physical terms, China's energy of 9.10 kilocalorie per ton of 
crude steel was significantly lower than India's 11.0 but higher than those 
of the other countries. These high levels of material consumption are partly 
a reflection of growth without efficiency. 
In summary, according to empirical studies, China's economic perform-
ance has been extremely disappointing over the last decades, in particular 
in the pre-reform period. Although Chinese industrial output growth has 
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TABLE 4 
MATERIAL USE INDICATORS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES" 
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NOTES a n d SOURCES: 
" Data are draw from WORLD BANK (1985b); 
b S-k = South Korea; 
c W-G = West Germany; . 
d Kilograms of coal equivalent per US dollar of GDP or output, in 1980; 
e Tons of crude steel per US dollar of GDP or output, in 1981; 
1 Ton-kilometers per US dollar of GDP or output, 1980-1981; 
« Net output of the broad industrial sector; 
h Kilocalorie per ton of crude steel, 1980; 
' 1000 kilocalorie per 100 actual payload ton-kilometer, 1980. 
been high this growth has been achieved only through an equal or faster 
rate of growth of inputs. This has to change if China's industrial output 
growth is to be maintained. Without more efficient use of capita , energy 
and other materials, it is unlikely that China could achieve the high rate of 
growth needed to meet the target of national economic development. 
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4. Economic Reform in the Industrial Sector 
Background of the Reforms. — In the pre-reform Chinese economic model, a 
pervasive state regulates industry and agriculture by means of centralized 
directive plans, enforced by a network of political and administrative agen-
cies. The role of markets is limited. Experience over the last four decades 
in China suggests that whereas directive planning can play a positive role in 
the initial stages of industrialization in certain circumstances, this potential 
for success is highly contingent, subject to severe limitations, and purchased 
at considerable cost (White, 1984). In general, economic growth in one 
sector, say heavy industry, has been achieved at the cost of other sectors 
(e.g. light industry, commerce and services). As the economy grows more 
complicated and the sources of extensive growth dwindle, the problems 
with central planning become increasingly multiplied. Furthermore, as the 
country opens its door to the world, international competition exerts pres-
sures for more flexible economic management and a more dynamic struc-
ture. These pressures combined with the success of reforms in other centrally 
planned economies have forced a reconsideration of the role of markets in 
the Chinese socialist economy, i.e. the economic reform. 
Economic reform in China as in other socialist countries started with 
the debate between the competitive and complementary views of the rela-
tions between plan and market (Liu and Zhao, 1982; and White, 1988). 
There was no blueprint to serve as a guide; and macroeconomic stability 
could follow when the system of planning was being dismantled. As a 
result, the reforms have been implemented on the basis of trial-and-error. 
The fact that stabilization and market reforms are both needed more or less 
at the same time led to great uncertainty in reform policies, with much 
experimentation and modification to cope with unforeseen problems. As 
some economists put it, there may have been reform cycles over time, 
however, each reform cycle has been a progressive development of eco-
nomic and administrative decision-making authority (World Bank, 1990a). 
This decentralization has certainly had a significant impact on the system's 
flexibility and on its capacity to respond to economic opportunity. In the 
following sections, we briefly summarize some of the policy changes which 
constitute the major reform packages over the last decade in China 6. 
Multiplicity of Ownership. — Before the economic reforms, China's economy 
6 For comprehensive surveys on reforms in China, see more detailed discussions in REYNOLDS 
( 1 9 8 8 ) , TIDRICK a n d CHEN ( 1 9 8 7 ) a n d W E I and CHAO ( 1 9 8 2 ) . 
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was dominated basically by two forms of socialist ownership: ownership by 
the whole people as in all state enterprises and collective ownership by the 
working people as in the rural people's communes. In late 1970s and early 
1980s, it was well recognised that a system totally reliant on state and 
collective ownership created grave problems for economic activities (Wood-
ward, 1985). Under this system, all economic units of society are operating 
with low efficiency, supplies of daily necessities fell behind demand, com-
modity circulation slowed down, more and more enterprises ran in the red 
and unemployment rose, to cite a few. However, it is argued that there are 
many advantages for the development of the non-state sector, in particular 
for the development of the rural township, village and private enterprises, 
i.e. TVPs. The following advantages of developing rural TVPs, for example, 
are reported: (1) efficient resource use: the rural TVPs have the ability to 
utilize dispersed deposits of raw material resources; (2) capital saving: they 
lower average capital-output ratios and shorten the gestation periods; (3) 
complement the modern sector: the rural TVPs have the ability to under-
take repairing maintenance, processing activities, and freeing large-scale ca-
pacity for jobs which the modern sector alone would do; (4) contribution to 
urbanisation: they reduce the costs of urbanisation and social overhead 
capital in general and finally, (5) entrepreneur ship-creation: the rural TVPs 
are believed to have the capacity to create industrial consciousness among 
the peasantry (Y. Wu, 1990; and Riskin, 1971). 
Due to the policy shift in favour of multiple ownership, individual 
enterprises have been encouraged and family enterprises have mushroomed. 
The GVO share of the state sector among the industrial total, for instance, 
decreased from 78.47 percent in 1979 to 64.86 percent in 1985 and 52.94 
percent in 1991, a loss about ten percentage points every five years accord-
ing to Table 5. By contrast, the other sectors, i.e. the collective, individual 
and other, gain about 10 percentage points in terms of GVO shares over 
the same period of time. In particular, the GVO share of the individual and 
other sectors in Table 5, usually classified as the "private sector" or "non-
state sector" in the Chinese system, rose from zero to a significant figure 
within ten years. 
It is apparent that the state and collective sectors as a whole, usually 
classified as the "public sector" in the Chinese system, still dominate the 
Chinese economy. But, the so-called "private sector" had been increasing 
dramatically in the 1980s. Its GVO share increased from zero in 1979 to 
about 11 percent in 1991. In fact, a considerable number of private enter-
prises are registered as collectives (Guo et al., 1992; and Young, 1991), 
therefore the share of private firms is actually far larger than the recorded 
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TABLE 5 
STRUCTURE OF CHINESE INDUSTRY BY OWNERSHIP, 1953-1991 
State Collective Individual Other Total 
1953 43.04 3.87 19.26 33.83 100 
1957 53.77 19.03 0.83 26.37 100 
1958 89.17 10.83 100 
1965 90.07 9.93 100 
1975 81.09 18.91 100 
1979 78.47 21.53 100 
1980 75.96 23.54 0.02 0.48 100 
1985 64.86 32.08 1.85 1.21 100 
1990 54.60 35.62 5.39 4.38 100 
1991 52.94 35.70 5.70 5.66 100 
NOTES a n d SOURCES: 
Data are the shares of gross value of output (GVO) from SSB (1992, Table 10.6, p. 408); "Other" 
includes joint ventures by state and collective, state and individuals, collective and individuals, 
China and foreigners; and enterprises owned by overseas Chinese and foreigners (SSB, 1991, p. 
463). 
value. The presence of private enterprises in the economy has contributed 
greatly to the economic growth and industrial development in China. The 
market-oriented behaviour of the "non-state sector" brings competition and 
hence improves the overall efficiency in the economy. 
Profit Retention Scheme. — The profit retention scheme aims at making 
enterprises more responsible and reduce waste. It was initiated on the 
basis of early small-scale experiments, notably in Sichuan province. Original-
ly, the experiments involved only a small group of enterprises but their 
successes led to the scope of the experiments being expanded rapidly. Due 
to its scope of application, this policy was finally ratified in mid 1979 by 
the State Council which issued the "Regulations on the Retention of a 
Portion of Profits by the State Enterprises" (Field, 1984). 
Under this policy, the enterprises were allowed to retain a fixed part of 
their profits. The retained funds can be used freely to some extent by the 
enterprises. They are, for example, to be used to contribute to self-financing, 
to be allocated to the factory's social services (housing, canteen, hospitals) 
and distributed as bonuses. However, for individual firms, profitability de-
pends pardy on commodity prices and the historical accident of investments. 
Retention rates differ widely among enterprises and even for the same 
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enterprises over time. Enterprises and their employees became concerned 
with their profit. In other words, the possibility of retaining profits has 
considerably increased the profit-oriented behaviour of the firms. As a re-
sult, efficiency performance should improve over time due to the greater 
incentives for the firms to maximize profit. 
Credit and Investment. - Chinese reformers recognised early that capital 
charges are a precondition for the financial autonomy of enterprises. Before 
the reforms, working capital and investment funds were supplied to state 
industrial enterprises as interest-free budgetary allocations. Capital was thus 
costless to the enterprises. Under the new system, the bulk of capital ad-
vances would be in the form of bank loans, subject to repayment and 
carrying a cost in the form of interest. At the same time, the government 
stopped syphoning off enterprise revenues into state coffers and, instead, 
introduced a scheme that substituted tax payments for profit remittances 
These reforms, it was hoped, would raise the efficiency of capital 
utilization by introducing more caution and cost consciousness into manag-
ers' calculations about the acquisition and use of capital. As a result, there 
has been a movement towards greater commercialisation of capital provision 
along several fronts (White, 1988). Although many of the sources of in-
vestment funds remained bureaucratic and allocations continued to be made 
on politico-administrative grounds, the role of credit money was expanded, 
the regulating power of interest rates was increased, sources of investment 
finance proliferated and investment decisions were decentralized. 
Pricing and Marketing. - Alongside the financial and ownership reforms, the 
relaxation of controls over prices and commodity allocations has constituted 
a major item in the reform packages. Under the old regime prices were fixed 
by the authorities using an average cost plus mark-up rule (World Bank 
1990a). They were altered infrequently. As a result, they were distorted and 
did not reflect opportunity costs of commodities. For example, the washed 
coal price was only 45 percent of the international market price, crude oil 
30 percent, cast pig iron 70 percent, and plain carbon steel 60 percent (Wu 
and Zhao, 1987). The first break with tradition came in 1979 when a 
number of pricing policy reforms were introduced to help the structural 
change. The most important measure was a dramatic increase of 40 percent 
in agricultural procurement prices which served to stimulate agricultural 
production and, through higher peasant incomes, increase demand for indus-
trial goods (Chan, 1989; and Chai, 1986). 
Furthermore, floating and negotiating prices were introduced. By Au-
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gust 1982, floating pricing was virtually being applied to all products but 
subject to the band within which prices could fluctuate. Later in 1984, this 
pricing ceiling was abolished and enterprises were allowed to sell their 
above-plan commodities at the market. By that time, the two-tier price 
system was beginning to be accepted. In the late 1980s, the two-tier pricing 
system became firmly established. 
The waning of price controls was matched by the reduced incidence of 
planned direct allocation by the state. It was argued that a system relying 
on administrative decisions to mobilize and allocate material resources may 
play a positive role in the early stages of a socialist economy (Tang, 1987). 
But as the economy becomes more specialized and economic links more 
complex, this system ceases to work. It fails to create an efficient link 
between production and sales, and to reflect the real conditions of supply 
and demand. With the reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s, self-
marketing was introduced on a large scale. Enterprises were allowed to sell 
part of their products independently at the market, they signed contracts 
with other enterprises, set up their own shops and advertised their own 
products. By 1981 factories were directly selling about 20 percent of 
industrial consumer goods and, more remarkably, up to 100 percent of 
some types of machinery and other producer goods (Tidrick and Chen, 
1987). Evidence shows that changes in marketing have had a large and 
beneficial impact on enterprise behaviour (Tang, 1987). 
Pricing and marketing reforms affected a significant share of industrial 
output. Data from the National Conference on Material Flows in early 1986 
indicated that the number of categories of materials controlled by the state 
was reduced from 256 to 23 in 1985, and that unified allocation of coal, 
timber, steel, and cement to enterprises fell to 50, 30.7, 56.9, 19.4 percent, 
respectively. The internal tendencies and dynamics created by these reforms 
have had a great impact on the pattern of resource allocation and the behav-
iour of industrial decision makers. Overall, these changes should bring 
about high productivity. 
In summary, evidence shows that central planning in countries like 
China is always problematic and inefficient. It is obvious that a major shift 
is required in the running of the Chinese economy. The active pursuit of 
economic reforms in the last decades has brought about great changes in the 
Chinese economy. As a result, overall efficiency performance should im-
prove over time. China is committed to its journey from central planning to 
a market-oriented, "socialist commodity" economy. The recent events such 
as land lease and stock market show the firmness and continuity of further 
economic reforms in China (Pomfret, 1992). 
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5. Growth in the Post-Reform Era 
From the discussions in the preceding sections, it is obvious that the 
industrial sector in China has been growing at the expense of other sectors, 
in particular, the service sector. Without policy changes, this pattern of 
growth cannot be sustained in the long run. The economic reforms intro-
duced in the late 1970s and 1980s were to rectify these sorts of distortions 
in the economy. This section looks at the structural changes in the produc-
tion pattern in China after a decade of economic reforms. For the sake of 
simplicity, World Bank research results are used but it is noted again that 
there are many technical questions in relating these calculations to studies 
of other countries. 
Table 6 presents the GDP shares and growth rates of China during the 
TABLE 6 
G D P S H A R E S A N D G R O W T H R A T E S 3 
GDP Shares 
1965 1981 1982 1983 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
A 39 35.8 37 37 33 31 31 32 32 27 
S 23 17.2 22 18 20 23 20 21 20 31 
I 38 47 41 45 47 46 49 46 48 42 
M 30 24.5 n.a. n.a. 37 34 34 33 34 38 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
GDP Growth rates 
60/70 70/80 80/85 80/86 80/87 80/88 80/89 80/90 
A 1.6 3.2 9.4 7.9 7.4 6.8 6.3 6.1 
S 3.2 3.7 7.5 9.4 7.6 11.3 9.3 9.1 
I 11.2 8 7 11.1 12.5 13.2 12.4 12.6 12.5 
M n.a. 9 5 12.4 12.6 12.6 11.0 14.5 14.4 
Total 5.2 5.8 9.8 10.5 10.4 10.3 9.7 9.5 
NOTES and SOURCES: 
3 All data are from the World Development Indicators, WDR (various versions). A, S, I and 
M represent the agricultural, service, industrial and manufacturing sectors respectively. The 
industrial sector includes manufacturing, mining and infrastructure. 
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period of 1952-1990. According to this table, the GDP share of agriculture 
over the national total in China has declined over time. The service sector 
share in GDP has fluctuated over time but has shown a tendency to in-
crease. Finally, the industrial share of GDP has increased from 38 percent 
in 1965, to 49 percent in 1987 and to 42 percent in 1990. These observa-
tions are even clearer in the second part of Table 6 which presents the 
sectoral growth rates of GDP. We find that the sectors have been growing 
more evenly in the last decade than in the pre-reform period. In particular, 
the difference in the growth rates between industry and services has narrow-
ed over time. The growth rate of services in 1988 was even greater than 
the average growth rate of the economy as a whole. Furthermore, there is 
evidence, although controversial, which demonstrates that the total factor 
productivity of Chinese industry has increased since the inception of the 
reform program (Tidrick, 1986; and Chen et al., 1988a). Total factor produc-
tivity growth rates according to the estimates in Table 3 range from 2.4 to 
4.8 percent. 
However, in international perspective, the structure of production in 
China is still atypical in spite of the economic reforms over a decade. This is 
apparent in Table 7 which presents international comparisons. China still 
has a relatively small service sector in 1990 (31 percent GDP share), com-
pared to other developing countries e.g. India (40 percent) and lower-mid-
dle-income economies (50 percent) during the same period of time. In 
contrast, the Chinese industrial sector (42 percent GDP share in 1990) is 
extraordinarily large in comparison with India (29 percent in 1990) and 
lower-middle-income countries (31 percent). 
To sum up, the pattern of production in China has become less irration-
al due to the economic reforms in the 1980s. The empirical findings 
reported here so far show that economic growth in China over the last 
decade has been achieved through improvement in efficiency. However, in 
the context of international comparisons, China still has a long way to go to 
achieve a balanced and efficient growth pattern. This suggests the scope for 
further economic reforms in the economy. 
6. Conclusions 
China has developed a modern industrial sector over the last decades 
in spite of the political interruptions and civil chaos. In particular, in the 
1980s, China achieved the highest. GDP growth rates in the world. Further-
more, the development of rural industry has been extraordinarily successful 
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TABLE 7 
G D P S H A R E S A N D G R O W T H R A T E S O F S E L E C T E D C O U N T R I E S , 1 9 9 0 " 
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Total 9.5 5.3 3.9 2.6 2.5 2.4 
NOTES a n d SOURCES: 
" All data are from WORLD BANK, World Development Report 1990, pp. 220-223; all technical 
notes and definitions from this reference apply here; 
b OLI = other-low-income countries; 
c LMI = lower-middle-income countries; 
d MIE = middle-income-economies; 
e UMI = upper-middle-income countries; 
f ¡Average growth rates from 1980 to 1990. 
in recent years. Due to its place outside the plan system, the emergence of a 
strong non-state industrial sector has greatly invigorated an economy in 
which the state has for a long time manipulated the major economic activi-
ties. As a result, the industrial sector in the Chinese countryside is challeng-
ing the dominant role of the state industry in the economy. 
However, in international perspective, fast growth in China has not 
been achieved without cost. Empirical observations demonstrate that growth 
has been achieved only through equal or faster growth of human and mate-
rial inputs and through an unbalanced allocation of resources among sectors. 
This pattern of growth has to change if China is to maintain the target of 
national economic development. 
With the economic reform initiated in the late 1970s, efficiency per-
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formance in China has improved over time. It is shown that growth in the 
reform years has been achieved in association with an increase in produc-
tivity. However, in the context of international standards, China is still 
outside of the mainstream pattern of development. 
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CRESCITA, EFFICIENZA E RIFORMA NELL'INDUSTRIA CINESE: ESAME 
CRITICO 
Questo articolo esamina alcuni importanti problemi relativi alla crescita, ef-
ficienza e riforma dell'industria cinese. La Sezione 2 presenta una breve rassegna 
dello sviluppo industriale negli scorsi decenni. Viene anche considerata la crescita 
dell'industria rurale degli ultimi anni. La Sezione 3 esamina i problemi relativi 
alla crescita ed efficienza industriale nel contesto internazionale. La Sezione 4 
riassume alcuni importanti cambiamenti nella politica di riforma e la loro relazio-
ne con l'efficienza nel settore industriale. La Sezione 5 elabora i cambiamenti del 
modello di produzione dall'inizio della riforma e i problemi che rimangono dopo 
la riforma. La conclusione dell'autore (Sezione 6) è che nonostante la riforma 
economica iniziata alla fine degli anni '70 abbia migliorato l'efficienza dell'indu-




Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 41 (1994), N. 8, 675-696 
E C O N O M I C R E F O R M S A N D I N E Q U A L I T Y I N C H I N A 
by 
JOSEPH C.H. CHAI * and KARIN B. CHAI * * 
Socialism has many definitions, but one feature all agree on is that it 
attempts to ensure that the benefits of economic growth are distributed 
equitably. To the extent that market-oriented reforms are accompanied by 
increasing inequality they become less compatible with socialism. Hence the 
survival of China's socialism in future depends on the critical relationship 
between economic reforms and inequality. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine (a) the trends of inequality in 
China under the reforms and (b) to find out whether or not there is a 
correlation between the reforms and inequality in that country. 
The paper is divided into three sections. The first surveys the literature 
on the link between economic reforms and inequality. Section II presents a 
statistical analysis of China's income inequality during the 14 year reform 
period. Section III explores the sources of its income inequality. The paper 
concludes with a summary of the findings and some comments on inequality 
in China in the near future. 
Market-oriented Reform and Inequality 
Despite its significance for the survival of socialism there had been 
only a few theoretical investigations into the relationship between reforms 
and inequality in socialist countries. Among the few theoretical attempts to 
explain the nature of this relationship we can distinguish three schools of 
* Department of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane (Australia). 
* * Faculty of Commerce and Administration, Griffith University, Brisbane (Australia). 
An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 34th International Congress of Asian 
and North African Studies held in Hong Kong during 22-28 August, 1993. The authors are 
indebted to Dr. M. Alauddin for his helpful comments and suggestions. 
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thought; namely (1) the classical school, (2) the neo-liberal school, and (3) 
the barrier approach. , • • : 
The classical school holds that reforms are likely to result in increasing 
economic inequality because of the reintroduction of property income and 
incentive payments as well as the widening of wage differentials. 
A useful approach to analyze income inequality is to treat personal 
income as composed of two parts, namely wage and property income Hence 
the variation of personal income depends on the following factors: (1) I he 
relative shares of wage and property income, (2) the wage and property 
income differentials, and (3) the correlation of the distribution of these two 
types of income between individuals h 
By definition property income in a socialist economy is absent or 
negligible This is true even if one considers real income or income in kind, 
since property income in the form of surplus produced by capital assets is 
siphoned off by the state and redistributed more or less on an egalitarian 
basis to individuals either in the form of transfer payments or public con-
sumer goods. Hence, the variation of property income in a socialist society, 
whether nominal or real, is likely to be very limited. 
Similarly, it can reasonably be conjectured that the correlation between 
the distribution of labor and that of property income in a socialist society is 
likely to be nonexistent. In contrast to capitalist countries the variation ot 
income in a socialist society is further reduced by the relatively small varia-
tion of wage income due to the ideological commitment to equality. Hence, 
one would in general expect the inequality of income to be less in socialist 
countries than in capitalist ones. . , , 
Economic reforms involve the decentralization of property rights and 
a change in the preference structure of the political leadership. The former 
allows individuals to own capital assets and to earn property income. Since 
property income is less equally distributed than wage income reforms are 
expected to aggravate overall income inequality. The latter implies the 
willingness of the political leadership to compromise equality for the sake 
of growth. To maximise growth individual achievement motivation must be 
stimulated through better rewards, e.g. incentive pay and larger wage differ-
entials Since the share of wage income in total personal income is larger 
than property income a greater variation of wage income is seen by the 
classical school as the major contributing factor towards increased income 
inequality under economic reforms. 
~~ i V a r ( y ) = (Vat) P + Vat (W) + 2 Cov (P, W) whete Y is personal, P property, and W 
wage income; var variance and cov co-variance. 
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The neo-liberal school, represented by Szelenyi and Mancin (1987), 
Whyte (1986) and Nee (1989) see control rights of property as an equally 
important variable as monetary income contributing to inequality. They 
argue that income distribution in socialist countries is unequal because of 
a high concentration of control rights. The greater equality of monetary in-
come in socialist countries is merely an illusion for real income inequality is 
hidden in highly centralized economies through the existence of perquisites 
and other valuable privileges accompanying power. 
According to Szelenyi property income in a socialist society is central-
ized in the state budget and redistributed by the state in the form of income 
in kind and subsidies. However, state redistributors as a class are 'selfish' 
and 'favour' their own kind. Hence property income is mainly distributed to 
the already privileged and/or in power as is evident from the higher non-
wage compensation for the 'redistributive' class, such as housing, access to 
better education and medical facilities as well as subsidies which are only 
partially reflected in wage income. 
Economic reforms of socialist systems inevitably require the decentrali-
zation of property rights. This, together with the shift from bureaucratic to 
market allocation of goods and factors, reduces the power and control rights 
of the state bureaucrats. Hence, the neo-liberals hold that reforms lead to a 
more equal distribution of the control and income rights of capital assets, 
and thereby decrease income inequality. 
While the consideration of control rights is important, the neo-liberal 
approach suffers several major analytical weaknesses. Firstly, it focuses 
primarily on the distribution of income between two social classes only, 
namely the state bureaucrats and the immediate producers. Therefore it is 
essentially a macro-theory of income distribution, but as such it yields little 
insight into the size distribution of income within these two groups. 
Secondly, it is a static approach and does not take into account the 
effect of individual capital accumulation on property income. When this is 
permitted the variation of initial income among individuals is likely to lead 
to a variation of savings and capital accumulation and finally to an increased 
variation in property holdings and income because of the stochastic distribu-
tion of luck (Adelman and Robinson, 1989, p. 972). 
Szelenyi and Manchin (1987) later develop a more dynamic model 
and modify their proposition. This argues that after initial equalizing effects 
of the market-oriented reforms, the market creates its own inequalities. In 
the long run these reinforce those generated by the redistributive economy 
and leads to rising social stratification as a result of the reforms. 
While this revision improves their model it still leaves a major weak-
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ness in their approach. For in view of the fact that wage income normally 
accounts for three quarters of all income, the neo-liberal school under-
estimated the disequalizing effects of the widening wage differential and of 
the re-introduction of incentive pay. . , 
The barrier approach argues that economic reforms basically entail the 
dismantling of the market barriers and the shift from highly restricted to 
peAîcl markets of both goods and production factors. In a 
there is a large variety of institutional barriers, namely 1) barriers to the 
movement of goods and factors of production which result from ideological 
Wales against the market; (2) barriers to the flow and use of informat on 
wh ch afe due to the high degree of centralization of mformaUon and U 
barriers to opportunities which result in a less than optimal match of indivi-
duals and positions due to petty requirements, such as membership in the 
Communist party, a proper family background etc.. The reduction of these 
b a r T r c a n e t a increase or decrease inequality of 
ing on the particular parameters of the socio-economic system (Pryor, 1973, 
P P ' ^Barriers to information and the movement of goods and factors of 
product on keep them from moving to areas where they fetch the highest 
p ke and cause wide dispersions of prices for particular goods or factor 
over the economy. Hence, they result in relatively greater inequality. The 
neo classical general equilibrium analysis predicts that a reduction of hese 
barriers reduces the difference in factor prices between regions, industries, 
firms and individuals, and, hence, decreases the variation of total income^ 
Barrier to opportunities for labor and capital forestall a meritocracy nd 
thereby serve to decrease inequality. Economic reforms lift these bame 
andallow labor and capital to pursue their optimal allocation and highest 
productivity and income, and, hence, are likely to generate wider dispersion 
of oav and greater income inequality. 
in summary the distributive impacts of market-oriented reforms cannot 
be unambiguously determined in theory. On the one hand, econome 
inequality may rise with the re-introduction of property income, — 
payment and he reduction of barriers to opportunity for labor and capital 
to M y realize their highest earning potentials, as well as the deliberate 
attempt by the government to widen wage differentials. On the other hand, 
înequahty and stratification may decrease with decentralization of property 
rights and information, and with the reduction of barriers to the movement 
of goods and factors of production. Hence, the net effect of the reforms on 
inequality and stratification can only be empirically assessed on a case by 
case basis. 
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Trends in China's Income Inequality 
Measures of inequality vary considerably for the same population 
pending on the unit of analysis, the measure of income and the time period 
covered. Their selection is often limited by the availability of income data. 
In the context of China, the only reliable time-series data is that of rural 
and urban household income survey data by the State Statistical Bureau 
(SSB). Hence in the following discussion the unit of analysis is household 
income and specifically household income per capita. The concept of income 
adopted here is that of disposable income adjusted by transfer payments 
and receipts. The period covered is from 1978 to 1991. 
Before we present the result of our statistical analysis the limitations of 
the official income data should be noted. As a recent survey by a group of 
Western economists utilizing Western concepts show (Khan et al., forthcom-
ing) the SSB makes no allowance for the rental value of housing, and its 
coverage of income in kind and subsidies is less than comprehensive. Hence, 
the average income of urban and rural households in China is systematically 
underestimated. However, these limitations do not alter our conclusions 
significantly. For our analysis is based on a consistent set of income data 
and our primary focus is not the exact magnitude of inequality in China in 
comparison with other countries, but the time trend during the 14 years of 
reforms. 
Income differentials within a country are primarily determined by in-
come disparity (1) among rural households, (2) among urban households, 
and (3) between urban and rural households, e.g. the urban-rural income 
gap. With respect to the first, namely rural inequality, the Gini coefficient 
calculated by SSB reveals that it has risen significandy during the first 
phase of the reforms from 1978 to 1984 (see Table 1) and that the upward 
trend has continued unabated in the second phase as well. 
With respect to urban income differentials the Gini coefficient, esti-
mated from the SSB urban household income and expenditure survey data, 
indicates a comparatively smaller dispersion of income than in rural areas. 
Moreover, it declined from 1977 onward, with the Gini coefficient falling 
from 0.186 in 1977 to 0.168 in 1984, whereas rural household income 
dispersion increased. However, the trend of narrowing urban income disper-
sion reversed in 1983 and the trend of rising urban income inequality since 
then is unmistakable. 
In the first period of reforms the trend in urban-rural income disparity 
paralleled that of urban income differential. For the urban-rural income gap 
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narrowed from 2.36 to 1 in 1977 to 1.71 to 1 in 1984. Since 1985, 
however, it widened again. . 
So far we have referred to the urban-rural income gap oi an essentially 
monetary nature. However, the urban-rural real income gap, which includes 
income in kind, subsidies etc., may not correspond to the nominal one due 
to the above mentioned underestimation of income in kind and subsidies by 
the SSB survey data (see also Lardy, 1984). Provision of the income in kind 
in China heavily favors the urban population. Khan and colleagues, lor 
example, show that urban households received 39% of their disposable 
income in the form of subsidies, whereas rural huseholds were in tact 
paying 2 percent of their personal income in the form of net taxes. More-
over these taxes include only visible ones. If invisible ones, resulting from 
the low purchase prices for agricultural products paid by the government 
purchasing agency, are included, the rate of farm taxation is likely to be 
much higher. Thus, according to the estimate of Khan et al. the real income 
gap between urban and rural household in 1988 was at least 2.42 to 1 
instead of 2.05 to 1 (Khan et al. forthcoming). 
Another reason for the divergence between the real and nominal ur-
ban-rural income gap lies in the different rates of inflation between these 
two sectors. The trend of urban-rural real income differential can be inferred 
from that of urban-rural real consumption disparity 2. According to Table 1 
the latter roughly corresponds to the trend of the urban-rural nominal in-
come gap. For the urban-rural real consumption gap narrowed from 2.9 to 
1 in 1977 to 2.1 to 1 in 1985. Since 1985, however, the growth of the rural 
real consumption standard has slowed, whereas that of urban households 
accelerated. As a result the urban-rural real consumption gap has widened 
a g a mOverall income disparity also depends on the percentage share of the 
urban population or, more accurately, on the share of the non-agricultural 
population in the total population. Given an urban-rural income gap, migra-
tion of the population from the low-income countryside to high-income 
urban areas will increase the overall dispersion of income until the time that 
half the population lives in urban areas. Beyond that further rural-urban 
migration will decrease overall income disparity (Perkins, 1988, p. 639). 
As the data in Table 1 show, the share of the 'real' urban population 
namely the non-agricultural population, increased during the first phase of 
2 China's official pet capita consumption data cover both private and public consumption 
and ate therefore mote comprehensive in coverage of income in kind than the household income 
survey data. 
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TABLE 1 





















1977 0.186 236 
1978 0.212 — — — 285 17.9 
1979 — — — — 277 18.2 
1980 0.234 — — — 271 18.9 
1981 0.239 0.161 — 205 272 18.2 
1982 0.232 0.121 — 183 251 18.6 
1983 0.246 0.158 — 170 235 18.8 
1984 0.258 0.168 — 171 223 19.3 
1985 0.264 — 0.158 172 211 20.5 
1986 — — 0.158 195 222 20.7 
1987 — — 0.158 198 233 20.5 
1988 — — 0.169 205 235 20.7 
1989 — — 0.178 210 231 21.1 
1990 0.294 — 0.180 202 242 21.4 
1991 0.307 — 0.175 218 — — 
NOTES AND SOURCES: 
1. SSB (1987, pp. 4-7) and ZGNYNJ (1992, p. 23). 
2. Estimate from SSB's urban household income and expenditure survey data given in 
XIUSHENG ( 1 9 8 7 , p . 7 5 ) . 
3. Estimate from SSB's survey data in ZGTJNJ (1986, p. 579; 1987, p. 694; 1988, p. 809; 
1989, p. 729; 1990, p. 297; 1991, p. 277 and 1992, p. 283). 
4 & 5. As a percentage of income and consumption in the urban household, see SSB (1984, 
pp.167 & 169), ZGTJNJ (1992, p. 282) and XIUSHENG (1987, p. 60). 
5 . CHAI ( 1 9 9 2 B , p . 7 3 9 ) . 
6. Share of non-agricultural population, CHAI (1992b, p. 740). 
the reforms but it did so at a slow pace. Since 1985, however, its rate of 
increase has accelerated significantly. 
Piecing together the evidence, the overall income disparity appears to 
have remained relatively stable or even to have declined slightly in the first 
phase of the reforms due to the combination of a) the decline in the 
urban-rural income gap, b) the decline in urban income inequality, and c) 
the relatively stable share of the real urban population. But from 1985 on, 
with a widening urban-rural income gap, an increase in income inequality 
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within both the urban and the rural sectors as well as a rise in the share of 
the urban population, the overall income disparity has been on the rise 
again. 
Sources of Income Inequality 
Per capita household income, y is defined as income currently earned, 
Y net of transfer payments, tr, divided by the number of household 
members, ». Hence, y = (Y + tr)/n. Since income earned can be divided 
into wage income, W, which is related to employment and non-wage 
income, P, which is property or other type income unrelated to employment, 
per capita household income can be defined as Y = (W + P + tr)/n. 
This means that per capita household income differential or its variance 
depends largely on (1) the variance of per capita wage, property and transfer 
income among households; (2) the relative share of wage, property income 
and transfer payment in total household income, and (3) the correlation 
among households of these three types of per capita income. 
Urban Income Inequality 
Wage is the single largest component of urban household income. In 
1981 it accounted for more than 94 per cent of urban household disposable 
income. And even though its share has declined since then it still accounted 
for nearly three quarters of it in 1991. Hence most of the dispersion of 
urban household income can be attributed to the variation of their wage 
income. 
The variation of per capita wage income among urban households 
largely depends on the variation of their rate of employment and average 
wage and the correlation of these two factors among the urban households. 
The rate of employment in a household is the ratio between the 
number of employed to the number of household members which basically 
depends on demographic factors, especially on the number of children and 
their ages. Every child reduces the rate of employment in the family as it 
increases the number of dependents and reduces the mother's ability to be 
employed. This ratio also depends on the employment opportunities for 
housewifes and care facilities for under-working-age children. 
In the pre-reform period the variation in the rate of employment 
among urban households was significantly larger than that of their average 
ECONOMIC REFORMS AND INEQUALITY IN CHINA 6 8 3 
TABLE 2 
URBAN HOUSEHOLDS: RATE OF EMPLOYMENT AND 
AVERAGE INCOME DIFFERENTIALS 
Rate of employment Average income 1 
cities 2 cities & urban vs cities 2 cities & urban vs 
towns2 rural3 towns 3 rural3 
1981 289 122 134 — 160 
1982 287 — 123 132 — 150 
1983 245 — 114 151 — 152 
1984 240 — 109 158 — 156 
1985 233 199 100 243 159 189 
1986 — 194 97 — 167 205 
1987 — 190 95 — 166 209 
1988 — 186 93 — 180 219 
1989 — 181 93 — 193 225 
1990 — 176 93 — 195 217 
1991 — 165 95 — 193 229 
NOTES: 
1. Income per person employed. 
2. Ratio between highest and lowest income group in per cent. 
3. Ratio between urban and rural household in per cent. 
SOURCES: 
SSB (1988b, pp. 15, 27, 38, 51, 64, 77-8); ZGTJNJ (1986, p. 582; 1987, pp. 691, 694 and 697; 
1988, p. 809; 1989, p. 727; 1990, p. 297; 1991, p. 277 and 1992 pp. 282-3 and 306). 
wages. It explained two thirds of the per capita income differential between 
urban households (Xiusheng, 1987, p. 68). Column 1 of Table 2 shows that 
in the first reform period the rate-of-employment differential between the 
highest and lowest income group declined. Thus apart from the changing 
demographic structure the reforms appear to have favoured the lower in-
come group by opening more employment opportunities for them. Since 
during this period the average wage differential has not declined but in-
creased (see Table 3) the declining rate of employment differential was the 
major cause of the levelling of the urban income differential in this period. 
In the second phase of the reforms since the trend of the declining rate 
of employment differential among urban households continued (Table 2, 
column 2) the rising urban income inequality must be due to the increase in 
average wage differential among urban households. This is confirmed by 
Table 3 which gives a detailed breakdown of urban household income by 
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TABLE 3 
C I T Y H O U S E H O L D S : W A G E A N D N O N - W A G E I N C O M E D I F F E R E N T I A L S 1 
Wage2 Non-wage 2 
Average Basic Incentive Transfer Transfer 
wage pay pay payment 1 3 pagment I I
3 
1981 127 124 142 255 — 
1982 127 124 142 228 — 
1983 138 124 197 325 — 
1984 150 129 226 618 — 
1985 157 138 210 322 — 
1987 157 132 225 353 — 
1988 171 133 263 400 322 
NOTES: 
1. Ratio between highest and lowest income group in per cent. Figures for 1985-88 are not 
comparable with those of previous years because of the change in the number of income 
groups. 
2. Average per person employed. 
3. For an explanation see text. 
SOURCES: SSB (1988b, p. 28, 39, 52, 65 & 143; 1988a, p. 27; 1989, p. 24). 
income category. While the data are not complete (data for 1986 and 
1989-91 are not available) it shows that between 1981 and 1984 the aver-
age wage gap between the richest and the poorest urban households in-
creased slighdy. However, the gap was still lower than that of the rate of 
employment for urban households. Hence it has not been able to counter-
balance the income levelling effects of the narrowing rate of employment 
differential. However, since 1985 the wage gap between the urban richest 
and the poorest continued to rise and gradually caught up with the rate of 
employment gap among urban households. Indeed, it became the major 
source of increasing urban household income disparity during this period. 
Since average wage consists of standard pay and incentive pay, the 
average wage differential depends largely on the relative share of these two 
types of wages and their relative dispersion. Under the reforms the share ot 
incentive pay soared and reached almost half of total wage pay by the end of 
1990 Consequendy, as evident from Table 3, the basic pay differential has 
narrowed and become relatively stable during the first phase of the reforms. 
It even declined slightly after the wage reform of 1985. The incentive pay 
differential, however, was much wider and soaring during both phases of 
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the reforms. Hence the differences in incentive pay was a major source of 
average wage differential among urban households. 
Property or non-wage income is defined here to include both income 
from individual enterprises and property income per se, i.e. any interest 
earned from bank accounts, plus share dividends etc. Property income was 
negligible during the first period of the reforms. Since 1985 its share in total 
urban disposable income has increased from 2 to about 3 per cent in 1991 
(ZGTJNJ, 1992, p. 282) but it is not yet an important source of urban 
income inequality. 
Transfer payments in China consist of two types. Type I is provided by 
enterprises and is 'known as other incomes from household employment 
units'. Type II is provided by the state in the form of price subsidies, child 
allowances, pensions and other welfare benefits. Social services (social bene-
fit in kind) are not included in disposable income. Both types of transfer 
payments constitute an important element of urban household disposable 
income. During 1975-91 its share rose from 16 to 25 per cent {ibid, p. 282). 
The distribution of type I transfer payments between urban households 
was rather unequal as it largely depends on the financial situation of enter-
prises which employ the main breadearner of the household. This is con-
firmed in Table 3 which shows that the gap of transfer payment of type I 
per capita between the richest and the poorest urban households was signifi-
cantly larger than their average wage gap. There is also a pronounced trend 
towards rising disparity in transfer payments distributed by enterprises. 
Hence it can be reasonably concluded that another major source of rising 
urban income inequality during the second phase of the reforms was the 
unequal distribution of transfer payments by enterprises. Some of these 
were in fact disguised wage payments made in an attempt to avoid payment 
of the bonus and wage adjustment tax. 
In the attempt by the government to improve the material situation of 
low-income groups and families with children as well as pensioners, the 
share of type II transfer payments rose rapidly in recent years. In 1985 it 
made up almost 10 per cent of urban household disposable income and by 
1991 it reached 17.8 per cent {ibid, p. 282). 
Data on the distribution of type II transfer payments by income groups 
are available only for 1988. These show that the gap between the richest 
and poorest urban households for this type of transfer payments was about 
3.22 to 1 in 1988, which was much higher than that of the average wage 
gap (1.71 to 1). Hence the effects of this type of transfer payments are more 
disequalizing than the effects of wages. However, its gap was smaller than 
that of all other sources of income (SSB, 1988a, pp. 2-3). Hence, in contrast 
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to type I transfer payments the latter have a narrowing effect on per capita 
urban household income differential, a finding which is also confirmed by 
Khan et al. (forthcoming). 
Rural Income Inequality 
Rural household net income is derived from two sources: agricultural 
and non-agricultural. Despite the rise of township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) and other non-agricultural activities of rural households, earnings 
from agricultural activities still accounted for 72 per cent of rural household 
income in 1991 (ZGTJNJ , 1992, p. 307). Hence, most of the variation of 
rural household per capita net income can be explained by the varia-
tion of earning from agricultural activities. Unlike urban households, a 
significant proportion of rural household earning from agricultural produc-
tion is implicit property income, P, or rent on land, the height of which 
depends on the land-man ratio (Id/n) and the average rent received, r, or 
P/n = Id/nr. Since the land-man ratio depends largely on the availability 
of cultivated areas in the region and average rent depends mainly on the 
quality and location of these lands, the level of individual rural household 
income from agricultural activities depends very much on spatial factors. 
Earnings from non-agricultural activities accounted for about 25 per 
cent of the total net income of rural households in 1991. Its largest single 
source of earnings from non-agricultural activities was wage income which 
made up 9 per cent in 1991. Since wage income was derived mainly from 
employment in rural TVEs, rural household wage income differential de-
pends largely on the degree of rural industrialization of the regions. 
China is a country of vast differences between provinces and regions 
in terms of agricultural development and rural industrialization. As a result, 
rural per capita income varies a great deal between provinces. For example, 
per capita income of Shanghai peasants in 1985 was more than three times 
that of those in the poorest province, Gansu (Table 4). By 1990, the income 
gap between the two had risen to a ratio of more than 4 to 1. The rising 
trend of the inter-provincial rural income inequality is also evident from the 
estimated population weighted coefficient of variation which rose from 
0.7389 in 1985 to 0.75563 in 1990. 
There are several reasons why regional rural income disparity has 
increased under the reforms since 1978. One of the reasons is related to the 
distribution of property or implicit rental income. Prior to the reforms the 
government siphoned part of the implicit rental income off in the form of 
ECONOMIC REFORMS AND INEQUALITY IN CHINA 6 8 7 
REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN PER CAPITA NET INCOME 










































848.2 100.0 398 
3.9 0.5 775 
3.7 0.4 565 
4.3 0.5 806 
22.2 2.6 468 
68.0 8.0 408 
52.2 6.0 493 
34.1 4.0 609 
22.9 2.7 397 
50.0 5.9 495 
48.4 5.7 385 
19.7 2.3 398 
14.6 1.7 414 
68.9 8.1 329 
21.0 2.5 358 
44.6 5.3 397 
39.1 4.6 421 
48.9 5.8 395 
28.7 3.4 377 
88.3 10.4 315 
25.0 3.0 295 
34.6 4.1 303 
3.3 0.4 321 
1.8 0.2 353 
9.3 1.1 394 
14.4 1.7 360 
30.5 3.6 338 
26.4 3.1 288 
17.5 2.1 255 
2.9 0.3 343 
Coefficient of variation, population weighted: 
0.7389 '0.7556 
SOURCE: CHAI ( 1 9 9 2 b , p . 7 3 8 ) . 
low fixed prices for agricultural products and redistributed it on an egalitar-
ian basis favoring poorer regions. Another part of the implicit rent was 
retained by the collective for capital accumulation. Since the government 
applied pressure on the collectives in the more affluent regions to save a 
relatively higher proportion of their net output, this had an equalizing effect 
on regional income distribution. However, with the introduction of the 
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household responsibility system (HRS), the collapse of the commune system 
and the increase of agricultural purchase prices, as well as the decentraliza-
tion of fiscal resources, a large part of the implicit rent was returned to the 
peasants (Chai, 1985) and is now retained within the region of its origin. 
Thus the reforms lead to greater regional income disparity. 
Another reason is the unequal distributive effect of the state agri-
cultural purchase price policy. Under the two-track agricultural procurement 
system peasants were obliged to sell a portion of their output to the state at 
a state-fixed contract price and they were free to sell the remainder on the 
market at market prices. Since the market price tends to be higher than the 
contract price the two-track system caused the effective price received 
by peasants to vary with the size of their output. Therefore the average 
purchase price received by peasants in rich regions, where output is high, 
is relatively higher than in poor regions, where most of the output is either 
self-consumed or sold to the state at the low contract price and where only 
marginal amounts are left for sale at higher market prices. 
Yet another disequalizing factor was the government policy of preferen-
tial development of the relatively prosperous Eastern seaboard provinces. 
This area, in contrast to the inner regions, not only received the lion share 
of state investments but was also declared an open area where foreign trade 
and investment restrictions were lifted and special incentives were offered 
to attract overseas investment (Kueh, 1992). The increased inflow of state 
and foreign investment into this region, though concentrating mainly in 
cities, have benefited rural industries and the surrounding rural areas by 
expanding their market (Knight & Song, 1993, p. 202). 
Last but not least, the lifting of the barriers to the movement of the 
factors of production across regions should be expected to have an equaliz-
ing effect on regional income distribution as capital inflow into poorer 
regions and the movement of labor away from them should improve their 
economic situation. Unfortunately, so far the rate of migration in rural areas 
remains relatively low. Between 1985 and 1990 only 0.24 per cent of the 
1990 rural population aged 5 and above moved from one country to another 
(Knight & Song, 1993, p. 210). On the other hand, the lifting of barriers to 
opportunity for regions to pursue their own comparative advantage and 
fully exploit their own potential either in agricultural or rural industry 
should allow rich regions to grow faster and hence contribute to increased 
dispersion of rural income among regions. 
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Rural-Urban Income Differential 
If transfer payments and receipts are disregarded, the urban-rural per 
capita household income gap is simply the ratio of per capita urban 
household wage income (number of wage earners, lu, times their average 
wage, u>, divided by the number of urban household members, nu, or 
lu/nuw) to that of rural household net income (number of rural income 
earners, Ir, times their average wage and property income, Yr, divided by 
the number of rural household members, nr or Ir/nrYr). This ratio therefore 
critically depends on (a) the rate-of-employment gap, namely lu/nu/lr/nr, 
and (b) the average earning-gap, w/yr, between urban and rural households. 
An analysis of the trend of these two determinants of the urban-rural 
income gap is given in Table 2 (column 3 and 6). It shows that the de-
creased urban-rural income disparity during the first phase of the reforms 
(1981-4) was mainly attributable to the narrowing of both the rate-of-
employment gap and the average earning gap. The increased employment 
opportunities available to rural households as a result of the introduction of 
HRS, the lifting of restrictions on rural households in engaging in non-
agricultural activities undoubtedly contributed significantly to the narrowing 
of the urban-rural rate-of-employment and, hence, of the income gap during 
this period. 
During the second phase of the reforms the rate-of-employment gap 
continued to narrow. However, its pace slowed down. At the same time, 
after an initial decline, the average earning gap between the two household 
groups increased significantly. For while it was merely 1.56 to 1 in 1984 it 
widened to 2.29 to 1 in 1991. This apparently was the main source of 
widening urban-rural income gap in the second period of the reforms. 
Given the relative rate of employment in urban and rural households, 
the basic wage in urban households, the urban-rural average earning gap 
depends critically (1) on the workers' share in firm profits, (2) on the 
relative prices of agricultural and industrial products or the agricultural 
terms of trade, and (3) on the input-output relation or productivity in both 
the agricultural and industrial sector 3. An improvement in the agricultural 
5 The urban-rural average earning gap is a ratio of average wage (basic, Ws, plus 
incentive pay, Wb) of urban income earners, la, to the average net income of rural earners, 
lr. If rural earning from non-agricultural activities and any fixed cost of agricultural produc-
tion are disregarded and if it is further assumed that all agricultural inputs are purchased from 
the industrial sector, the average net income of rural earners is equal to total sales of 
agricultural products, IPaQa less total purchase of agricultural inputs S Pi Qi divided by 
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terms of trade and productivity will reduce the urban-rural average earning 
gap whereas its worsening will increase it. 
Table 5 shows that during the first period of the reforms the agricultur-
al purchase price grew much faster than industrial prices. This, coupled with 
the increase in agricultural productivity under the HRS, was one of the 
main sources of the narrowing of the urban-rural household average earning 
gap in the period. In the second period of the reforms the growth of 
industrial prices caught up with that of agricultural products and overtook it 
resulting in the fall of agricultural relative prices. This, together with the 
slowdown of agricultural productivity growth (Chai, 1992a) was one of the 
factors behind the rising urban-rural average earning gap. Another contribut-
ing factor to the rising urban-rural household average earning gap was the 
rising share of enterprises and workers in profits in the urban sector under 
the management contract responsibility system introduced in the second 
phase of the reforms (Chai, 1991). 
Summary and Outlook 
In contrast to expectations by neo-liberals, the reforms in China over 
the last 14 years have not decreased but increased inequalities. However, 
the trends are complex: overall income inequality has remained relatively 
stable or even declined slightly during the first phase of the reforms 
1978-84. But in the second phase from 1985 up to the present the trend 
towards greater inequality is unmistakable. The initial improvement in in-
come distribution was mainly due to the declining urban income inequality 
and the narrowing of the urban-rural income gap. The former was due to 
the reduction of the rate-of-employment gap between the richest and the 
poorest urban households. The latter in turn was caused by the reduced 
differentials of both the rate of employment and average earnings between 
urban and rural households. 
the number of rural earners or (I Pa Qa -XPiQi)/Lr. Hence the urban-rural average earning 
differential is 
(Ws + Wb)/(X Pa Qa — X Pi Qi)/lr 
If it is assumed that all inputs of the firm are purchased from the agricultural sector and 
if any fixed cost are disregarded, then, because incentive pay of workers is linked to enterprise 
profit, Wb is equal to a (X Pi Qi - XPaQa)/\u where a is the workers' share in the firm's 
profit. By simplifying and rearranging, the urban-rural average earning gap can be shown to be 
l/(X Pa Qa - X Pi Qi) [lrWs + a Ir/lu (X Pi Qi - X Pa Qa)\ 
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TABLE 5 
INDEX OF AGRICULTURAL PURCHASE AND 
INDUSTRIAL RETAIL PRICES, 1978-1990 
Average farm 
procurement price 1 
(1) 








1978 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1979 122.2 100.0 122.2 
1980 130.8 100.9 129.7 
1981 138.6 101.9 136.0 
1982 141.6 103.6 136.7 
1983 147.8 104.6 141.3 
1984 153.7 107.8 142.6 
1985 166.9 111.3 150.0 
1986 177.6 114.9 154.6 
1987 198.9 120.4 165.2 
1988 244.7 138.7 176.4 
1989 281.4 164.7 170.9 
1990 274.1 172.2 159.2 
Annual average growth: 
1978-1984 7.4 1.2 6.1 
1984-1990 10.1 8.1 1.1 
NOTE: 
1. All figures refer to state purchase prices only. 1978-84 figures include quota, above quota 
and negotiated prices, and 1985-90 figures include contract, proportion and negotiated prices 
SOURCE: ZGTJNJ (1991, p. 230). 
As predicted by the barrier approach, the lifting of the barriers to 
employment in individual private enterprise activities under the reforms 
opened up relatively more employment opportunities for the urban poor 
and, hence, reduced the gap in the rate of employment among urban house-
holds. Similarly, the lifting of the restrictions for farmers to engage in non-
agricultural activities and in rural-urban migration has improved the rate of 
employment for peasant households relative to their urban counterparts. 
The initial decline in the urban-rural earning gap can in part be attrib-
uted to the decentralization of property rights under the HRS and the 
resulting increase in farm productivity. However, it was also due to the 
increased state's agricultural purchase price in that period. 
The rise of income inequality since 1985 was triggered by an increase 
in intra-sector inequality in both the urban and rural sectors as well as the 
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widening urban-rural income gap accompanied by a rising share of the urban 
in total population. Again, market-oriented reforms played a significant role 
in increasing inequality during this period. However, state policies rein-
forced the tendency towards growing inequality rather than ameliorating it. 
The rise of urban inequality during this period was mainly due to 
growing wáge differences, especially in incentive pay for urban workers. 
The differential in incentive pay can in part be attributed to the market-on-
ented reforms as these created greater differences in reward in order to 
generate achievement motivation. However, they were also partly caused 
by state policy especially since the state was reluctant to modify property 
relations of and to introduce capital charge for state-owned enterprises. 
Thus workers' pay contained an element of quasi rent and depended largely 
on enterprise profit. Enterprises with better access to state capital were able 
to acquire a quasi rent which was then distributed to workers as wages, and 
hence, led to the growing inter-firm wage differentials. 
Another important source of the rising urban income inequality since 
1985 was the growing differential in transfer payments funded by enter-
prises. Their distribution was rather unequal as it depended largely on the 
financial strength and profitability of the individual enterprise. Since these 
payments and their structure are a legacy of the past, the inequality in in-
come generated by it can only be attributed to the state policy rather than 
to the impact of the reforms. 
The rising rural income disparity during the second phase of the re-
forms was largely accounted for by tjie growing inter-regional rural income 
differential, most of which can be attributed to the impact of market-ori-
ented reforms. The de-facto privatization of farm land and the collapse of 
the commune distributive system allowed peasants to appropriate most of 
the implicit rent on land. Peasants in regions with better land endowments 
and better access to transport and markets were able to acquire a relatively 
higher rent than others. The lifting of barriers for regions to fully exploit 
their own comparative advantage either in agricultural or non-agricultural 
activities also favored rich regions over poor ones. However, a part of the 
rising regional disparity in rural income was also due to the government's 
preferential development policy of the Eastern seaboard. 
Similarly, the widening urban-rural income gap during the second 
phase of the reforms was attributable to a combination of market factors 
and state policy. The growing urban-rural average earning gap mirrored 
mainly the growing urban-rural worker productivity gap. However, it was 
also pardy caused by the state policy of depressing state contract purchase 
prices for agricultural products below the market value in order to extract 
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surplus for urban-industrial development from rural areas (Kueh, 1993). 
Finally, the rising share of the urban population in the total population as 
a result of greater population mobility under the reforms also played an 
important role in increasing the urban-rural income differential. 
In the future the widening of the earning differential is likely to 
continue and perhaps even to strengthen. For it must be expected that the 
share of the urban population is likely to keep rising, a factor which alone 
will contribute to greater overall income inequality. Moreover, the market 
reforms are expected to continue to generate productivity and hence contri-
bute to greater earning differentials between urban and rural workers. This 
trend is going to be exacerbated by the state's policy of controlling the 
agricultural terms of trade which is most likely to continue for the sake of 
promoting urban industrial development with the help of rural surplus. The 
growing regional income disparities will also promote greater income inequal-
ity. However, this factor is likely to be weakened by the greater regional 
mobility of labor and capital. Finally, the current urban pay differential is 
considered too narrow by the government. The Gini coefficient of urban 
income distribution barely reached 0.2 in recent years, which according to 
the classification of SSB, is rated as "extremely egalitarian" (Zhang and 
Shucheng, 1991, p. 53). Hence an enlargement of this differential for the 
purpose of promoting efficiency and incentive is expected in the future. 
However, the prospect of inequality in China does not have to be quite 
as bleak as described above because the distribution of earnings between 
recipients is not necessarily identical with that of household income. Theoreti-
cally the latter can be made to differ from the former in order to reconcile 
the conflict between efficiency and equity (Chilosi, 1980). 
To reduce the extent of inequality generated by market-induced earn-
ing differential the state could, first of all, reform the funding of the 
welfare system. Since welfare provisions and services are presently enter-
prise and local collective funded they exacerbate inequalities, with the most 
prosperous collectives and enterprises able to provide the more and better 
quality facilities at the least cost to clients. Hence to arrest the rising trend 
of inequality social services need to be funded by the state and distributed 
according to need. 
Secondly, in order to prevent both enterprises and farms with access 
to better capital and land from reaping eccessive rent income, rental charges 
on both capital and land should be introduced. Another factor which might 
alleviate the growing inequality is the lifting of the barriers to movement of 
production factors across regions. So far this has not had much impact 
because inter-regional mobility of both labor and capital in China is still 
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constrained. Hence the development of a fully-fledged capital and labor 
market should help to ameliorate inequality in China. Finally, as in capitalist 
societies, a comprehensive progressive income tax could also make a consider-
able contribution to the narrowing of the household income differential by 
decreasing their earning differential. 
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RIFORME ECONOMICHE E DISUGUAGLIANZA IN CINA 
Il problema del se le riforme orientate verso il mercato hanno la probabilità 
di aumentare o diminuire la disuguaglianza nelle economie socialiste è una que-
stione empirica che non può essere risolta con ragionamenti aprioristici. Da un 
lato, la disuguaglianza economica può aumentare con la reintroduzione dei red-
diti patrimoniali e degli incentivi e con la riduzione degli ostacoli al lavoro e al 
capitale di realizzare il massimo potenziale di guadagno. D'altro lato, la disugua-
glianza può diminuire con la decentralizzazione dei diritti di proprietà, dell'infor-
mazione e con la riduzione degli ostacoli al movimento dei beni e dei fattori 
produttivi. L'esperienza cinese mostra che le disuguaglianze economiche non so-
no aumentate, ma anzi sono leggermente diminuite durante la prima fase delle 
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riforme Ma sono aumentate nella seconda fase. Questo articolo esamina le ragio-
ni della disuguaglianza causata dalle riforme in Cina ed espone alcune riflessioni 
sulle sue prospettive future. 
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
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I N T R A - U R B A N H O U S I N G P R I C E C O I N T E G R A T I O N : 
AN E M P I R I C A L A P P R O A C H 
by 
EFTHYMIOS G. TSIONAS * 
1. Introduction 
In view of the emergence of housing problems in urban areas, higher 
service standards and balanced urban growth through plans directed 
towards the demand side of the housing market, are often required. Intraur-
ban demand reallocation can contribute to greater urban efficiency, higher 
productivity and incomes as well as higher environmental quality. See for 
example Basta (1977), Linn (1983) and Dunkerley et al. (1983). 
In order to provide the necessary information, the structure of intra-ur-
ban housing prices has to be known, since effective price controls or supply 
reallocation must take into account the effects of the plan on several parts of 
the urban housing market. An important issue is whether or not intra-urban 
housing prices are cointegrated and what the characteristics of their interrela-
tionship are. 
Rosenthal (1986) in her study for the U.K., used cross-spectral tech-
niques to draw the conclusion that regional housing price changes are in-
deed highly associated, possibly due to national economic trends. The peri-
od of the common cycle was found to be approximately 2 to 4 months. One 
shortcoming of Rosenthal's (1986) approach is in the level of aggregation 
she uses - she divided the UK into only two regions - and that cross-spec-
tral techniques do not properly account for the complicated dynamics of the 
urban housing market, given the sample sizes we often use in applied 
econometrics. 
* Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN (U.S.A.). 
The author wishes to thank the participants of the Economic Policy Workshop (Spring 1989, 
Athens University of Economics) and an anonymous referee of this journal for his excellent 
comments. Of course the usual disclaimer applies. 
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The present study tries to rectify the shortcomings of the existing 
approach by using a Vector Autoregression (VAR) technique as well as 
cointegration-based methods to test for weak market efficiency. Given that 
the housing market has received strong attention as a profitable investment, 
market efficiency tests are particularly important as tools for designing effec-
tive price stabilization at the urban level (Dunkerley et al., 1983). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
theoretical VAR models and the fundamental issues behind the cointegra-
tion tests. Data is described in Section 3 while the empirical results are 
presented and discussed in Section 4. The final section concludes the paper. 
2. Model Specifications 
2.1. Housing Market Efficiency. - Over the last ten years, many tests of the 
efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) have been conducted in a variety of 
financial markets. A market is said to be efficient if market prices fully 
reflect all the available information (Fama, 1970). The EMH consists of the 
joint hypotheses that agents form their expectations rationally, and that they 
know the equilibrium process driving the excess returns (for which risk 
aversion or risk neutrality is a sufficient condition). See for example Bilson 
(1981). . 
In the past, the stock market, international currencies and asset mar-
kets have received attention as candidates of efficient markets. See Hakkio 
(1981), MacDonald and Taylor (1988), Huang (1984), Geweke and Feige 
(1979) and Cerchi and Havenner (1988). 
Urban housing markets are also candidates. The reason is that housing 
is an important asset with both speculative and risk-free price components, 
and therefore it is usually a significant part of portfolios of large investors 
and government agencies. On the other hand, rational expectations and 
non-risk-loving is all that is required to make excess returns zero and impose 
market efficiency. Given the potential forecasting ability of large investors, 
testing for the EMH at the intra-urban level becomes an interesting issue. 
The two joint assumptions of the EMH are often imposed in general 
equilibrium models of rational economic agents - see for example Sargent 
(1979) and Bossaerts (1988). If a market is efficient, un-coordinated actions 
lead to a Pareto optimum (Fama, 1976) and therefore governmental inter-
vention should be avoided. To the extent that housing prices are usually 
administered, tests for market efficiency are sine qua non for any rational 
policy making at the urban level. 
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2.2. The Vector Autoregression Model. - Andrikopoulos, Prodromidis and 
Tsionas (1990) introduce the concept of rational expectations in traditional 
demand models of the intra-urban housing market, following the methodolo-
gy of construction and estimation of a VAR scheme for housing prices (see 
Granger and Newbold, 1986, ch. 7). . 
Let P (i, t) be the housing prices at the urban area i at time period t 
(i = 1, ..., «; t = 1, ..., T). We assume the following linear stochastic 
process: 
p ( , ; t ) = I T * a , j , k ) P ( j , t - k ) + ua, t) G ) 
j=i k=i 
U = 1, 2 , . . . , n) 
where R (i, j) designates the number of lags of P (j, .) in the zth equation of 
the VAR and U (i, t) is a matrix-stochastic-process with a finite, positive 
definite covariance matrix, zero mean vector and zero intertemporal covar-
iance matrices. See for example Sims (1977). 
The estimation of (1) is carried out using the Minimum Final Predic-
tion Error (FPE) iterative scheme suggested by Hsiao (1981). See also 
Judge et al. (1985). The Minimum FPE iteration estimates the optimal 
number of lags R (z, j) by minimizing: 
FPE (i) = 5 ( z ) [ l + T-' Ï R {i,j)\ (2) 
where 5 (/) = [ r ' j ^ i /)] i = L .... « 
and Ü (., .) is the estimated residual series for the zth equation of the VAR. 
This criterion is due to Akaike (1969), while other approaches to the 
problem of order identification of approximating autoregressive schemes 
have been proposed by Akaike (1970), Parzen (1976) and Anderson 
(1963). After the sequential order identification procedure, we treat the 
estimated version of the VAR as the maintained hypothesis. Since the 
R (i, j)'s are not necessarily equal across equations, the efficient estimator in 
this'case is given by Zellner's (1962) iterative multivariate estimation meth-
od, fully equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator. 
2 3 Cointegration. - Cointegration is a statistical concept pioneered by 
Granger (1986), Granger and Weiss (1983) and Engle and Granger 
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(1987). In general, two non-stationary series are cointegrated if a linear 
combination of them is stationary. More precisely, assume that X (/) and 
Y (t) are two stochastic processes, integrated of order k, i.e I (k). If there 
exists c e R and the process U (t) = X (t) - cY (/) is I (m) the processes 
X(t) and Y (t) are said to be cointegrated of order k, m or C [k, m). 
Granger (1983) showed that two processes are C (1, 1) if and only if: 
X{t) -X{t — l) = a [X (/ — 1) - cY (t — 1)] + b[Y(t)-Y(t- 1)] + 
+ g{Y, X) + e(t) (3) 
where g (., .) is a linear function of first differences of the series and e (t) a 
possibly non-white stochastic process.This is in Hendry's (1964) terms an 
error-correction representation. 
The first cointegration test is based on a two-step approach by Engle 
and Granger (1987) and Coleman (1990). The first step is to test that 
housing prices are 7( 1), i.e. that they follow a random walk. To test the 
hypothesis the following equation is estimated: 
P(i t) = a + ßP(i, t - 1) + y Z P(i, t - j ) + u (t) (4) 
i = i 
The /-statistic for ß is used with critical values from Fuller (1976). The 
parameter L is selected to reduce the process u (t) to white noise. Given that 
housing prices are 7(1) the second step is to estimate the cointegrating 
regressions: 
P{i,t) = a+ I ßjP(j, t) + £(/) V K (5) 
I * i ' 
jeK 
and test whether or not £ (/) is stationary. K is a subset of the set of all 
possible combinations of (i, j). This test can be done using the augmented 
Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) statistic. If £ (/) rejects the hypothesis of 
7(1), urban housing prices are cointegrated and inconsistent with the 
EMH. It must be noted that for values of # K > 2 the properties of the 
test are not established. Therefore, the analysis is restricted only to all 
possible pairwise cointegrating regressions. See also Hakkio and Rush 
(1989) for a similar approach. 
3. Data 
The urban housing prices for Attica Department, Greece, will be used 
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to study market efficiency and housing price interrelationships. The data 
cover the period 1977-July until 1988-October. Effective housing prices 
were computed using raw data on the value of new buildings according to 
issued construction permits and on volume of regular rooms (in dwellings 
with 1-4 rooms) according to permits issued for new dwellings. The data 
came from the Monthly Statistical Bulletin of the National Statistical Service 
of Greece (various issues, 1977-1988). Three-month moving averages and 
logarithmic transformation were used. 
Attica Department was divided in two areas: Greater Athens and Rest 
of Attica Greater Athens includes four subregions: Athens, Piraeus, East 
and West Attica. The subdivision for Rest of Attica includes the parts of 
Piraeus, West and East that do not belong to Greater Athens. 
4. Empirical Results 
4 1 VAR Estimation and Testing. - Table 1 presents the optimal number of 
lags R [i, j) used in the VAR. Table 2 presents the causality tests for price 
exogeneity. The estimates cannot be interpreted in a structural sense and 
therefore they will not be reported here. Yet, the large proportion of statisti-
cally significant parameter estimates as well as the absence of error autocor-
relation (as indicated by the Box-Pierce "portmanteau" Q-statistic) imply 
that serious misspecification is not present, except possibly in the equation 
for Piraeus-Rest of Attica. 
TABLE 1 
V A R O R D E R S E L E C T I O N 
Area 
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TABLE 2 
C A U S A L I T Y T E S T S B A S E D O N V A R M O D E L 
Area 
Chi-square tests and degrees of freedom 
H 0 ( l ) H0 (2) « 0 (3) 
Athens 
Athens 11.13 2 49.73 5 _ 
Piraeus 93.68 13 39.27 5 4.21 1 
West 79.50 20 24.08 3 44.10 9 
East 47.38 7 56.60 3 7.02 3 
Rest of Attica 
Piraeus 49.68 9 57.2 3 48.16 8 
West 56.08 7 33.69 3 54.92 5 
East 62.19 11 0.17 1 27.63 5 
NOTE: For the definition of the hypotheses see equations (11)-(13) in the text. 
The applicability of the R2 measure of fit (not reported here) is limited 
in view of the adopted system-wide estimation technique. Generally, half of 
the data variability seems to be explained by the model - given the reserva-
tion mentioned above. 
To judge adequately the out-of-sample fit of the model, the appropriate 
approach is to use the Kalman filter algorithm to reestimate the model and 
evaluate measures of forecasting performance. Table 3 presents the results 
of model's performance with a forecasting horizon of 1, 5 and 10 time 
periods. Judging from the values of RMSE's for example, it is evident that 
the model does fairly well in horizons up to a year despite that monthly 
data were used. This also indicates that relying solely on R2's in dynamic 
econometric models, may sometimes be quite misleading. 
Three types of causality tests in Granger's (1969) sense are conducted: 
(1) In the ith equation all lags of prices in location; (i i) are insignificant, 
i.e. P (i, .) is exogenous with respect to the price system. 
(2) Own lags are zero, i.e. P (z, .) is completely driven by the other housing 
prices (i is a dependent area). 
(3) Lagged prices in Greater Athens (Rest of Attica) do not affect prices in 
Rest of Attica (Greater Athens). 
These tests were carried out using Zellner's (1962) multivariate estima-
tion technique and likelihood ratio X2 tests were used. Formally the tests 
can be described as follows: 
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TABLE 3 
F O R E C A S T S T A T I S T I C S F O R V E C T O R A U T O R E G R E S S I O N 
Kalman Filtering Estimation 
Mean Error Mean Absolute Error RMSE 
Equation STEPS = 1 
1 - .0446 .187 .236 
2 .0143 .258 .294 
3 - .0144 .227 .248 
4 - .0969 .219 .283 
5 .0409 .251 .292 
6 - .0352 .310 .419 
7 - .0781 .239 .307 
STEPS = 5 
1 - .0841 .184 .220 
2 .0282 .206 .224 
3 .0052 .246 .278 
4 - .0896 .239 .266 
5 - .0082 .338 .388 
6 .0073 .315 .434 
7 .2040 .319 .363 
STEPS = 10 
1 - .1059 .106 .106 
2 .6208 .621 .621 
3 .1743 .174 .174 
4 .1227 .123 .123 
5 - .1656 .166 .166 
6 - .2661 .266 .266 
7 .5149 .515 .515 
NOTE: RMSE stands for root-mean-squared-error. "Steps" refers to the number of forecasts 
being undertaken. Estimation period includes observations up to 1987-September. 
Let 
P(i, t) = ZA,(L)P(j, t) + U(t, t) (8) 
i 
i = 1, ..., n\ t > max R (i, j) 
where A¿j (L) is a polynomial of the lag operator (L) of order R (I, j). Let 
also 
A¿ (L) (i = 2) be a vector-valued function such that: 
Al(L) = [An(L) A22(L) ... A2n(L)] (9) 
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A2(L) = [Au(L) A12 (L) ... Aln(L)] (10) 
Then cases (1), (2) and (3) are equivalent to the hypotheses: 
H0 (1): Atj {L) = 0, j ^ i, i = 1, ..., n (11) 
H 0 (2) : AJL) = 0, /= 1, .... n (12) 
H0 (3): A¡ (L) = 0, i = 1, 2 (13) 
From Table 2 the following conclusions emerge: 
First, all prices seem to be interrelated. No price has been found to be 
Granger-exogenous. Second, only prices for E. Rest of Attica are dependent. 
Third, for two regions of Greater Athens Piraeus and E. Attica) prices 
conform to H0 (3), that is Rest of Attica's prices do not influence prices in 
Piraeus and E. Attica. 
Overall, there is a strong pattern of dynamic association as the long 
lags involved testify (see Table 1). Moreover, the results conform to Rosen-
thal's (1986) study for the UK. 
4.2. Market Efficiency Tests. - Table 4 reports the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests for the first-step regressions. Values of L reported here, include 
L = 2, 4 and 7. At lag L = 7 the errors have been reduced to white noise. 
From the values of ¿-statistics it is apparent that the price series can be 
TABLE 4 
A U G M E N T E D F I R S T - S T E P D I C K E Y - F U L L E R C O I N T E G R A T I O N T E S T S 
L = 2 L = 4 L = 7 
1 -1.64 -1.33 -1.61 
2 - .668 - .803 - .812 
3 - .404 - .317 - .483 
4 -1.93 -1 .95 -2.14 
5 -1.34 -1 .36 -1.54 
6 -1 .78 -1 .88 -1.72 
7 -1.21 -1.24 -1 .18 
NOTE: At lag L = 7 all equation errors are free from autocorrelation as the Q-statistics 
indicated. At lag L = 4 only equation 5 showed a marginally significant Q-statistic. From 
FULLER (1976) the 5 % critical value is approximately 2.50 in absolute value. Regions are (1) 
Athens, (2) Piraeus, (3) East and (4) West Attica. Rest of Attica includes (5) Piraeus, (6) West 
and (7) East Attica. 
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TABLE 5 
A U G M E N T E D S E C O N D - S T E P D I C K E Y - F U L L E R C O I N T E G R A T I O N T E S T S 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 - .474 - .288 - .335 - .299 - .428 - .434 
2 - .507 -.307 - .328 - .348 - .429 - .496 
3 - .251 - .258 - .290 - .238 - .370 - .405 
4 - .440 - .421 - .431 - .403 - .585 - .552 
5 - .313 - .343 - .265 - .291 - .410 - .363 
6 - .445 - .425 - .459 - .478 - .447 - .417 
7 - .512 - .572 -.533 - .501 - .449 - .524 
NOTE: From FULLER (1976) the 5% critical value is approximately 2.50 in absolute value. 
Seven lags were used to augment the Dickey-Fuller test. Regions are: (1) Athens, (2) Piraeus, 
(3) East and (4) West Attica. Rest of Attica includes (5) Piraeus, (6) West and (7) East Attica! 
Entry (/, ;') reports the regression coefficient of P (i, t) on P (J, t) and a constant term. 
reasonably taken to be 7(1). At the second-step, we test whether or not 
the residuals are stationary. The relevant augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for 
all possible pairwise cointegrating regressions are reported in Table 5. 
The low values of /-statistics, indicate that the residuals do follow 
a random walk and therefore housing prices are not cointegrated. This 
confirms that the urban housing market is efficient. Similar results were 
obtained when higher orders of combinations were examined. For k = 6 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests ranged from - .212 to - .451. So the 
hypothesis that the residuals of the cointegrating regression are stationary, 
is rejected thus conforming compatibility with the EMH. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the paper was to test for causal orderings and market 
efficiency in the urban housing market. From the VAR model one may 
conclude that strong dynamic correlations exist between the housing price 
series. The cointegration-based tests showed that the markets are weakly 
efficient and therefore it is not possible to use past information to forecast 
future values of urban housing prices. 
Besides indicating that causality tests do not suffice to reveal the true 
dynamic properties of time series, the analysis also suggested that Athens' 
urban housing markets are efficient and therefore government's intervention 
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will be of questionable effectiveness, since it will necessarily move the 
markets away from a Pareto optimum. 
An interesting subject for future research is to examine the paradox 
discovered in this study, namely that cointegration-based tests support the 
EMH while VAR and causality analysis suggests important dynamic link-
ages (that can be used effectively to forecast future prices). A possible 
resolution will most likely be the low power of VAR-FPE tests under the 
EMH for the sample sizes one most often has to consider. 
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COINTEGRAZIONE DEI PREZZI DEGLI ALLOGGI URBANI 
L'articolo esamina il problema dell'interazione del prezzo degli alloggi urba-
ni allo scopo di trarre delle conclusioni sulla cointegrazione dei prezzi e sulla 
debole efficienza del mercato degli alloggi urbani in Grecia. Vengono qui applica-
ti dei test di causalità per verificare l'esogenità delle serie dei prezzi e dei test ba-
sati sulla cointegrazione dell'efficienza del mercato. Sono inoltre discusse le impli-
cazioni dei risultati empirici sulla politica urbanistica. 
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F O O D S U P P L Y A N D I N F L A T I O N I N N I G E R I A : 
A S I M U L T A N E O U S E Q U A T I O N A P P R O A C H 
by 
ANTHONY E. AKINLO * and AYODELE F. ODUSOLA * 
1. Introduction 
The literature is replete with studies on the dynamics of inflation in 
both advanced and developing countries. Most of the theoretical and empiri-
cal studies on inflation, however, have dealt either with the relationships 
between wages and inflationary pressures or with inflation and demand, or 
with inflation and fiscal deficits \ A large number of studies have concen-
trated on the link between monetary expansion and inflation 2. Few studies 
have also dealt with the infuences of such factors as interest rate, exchange 
rate and tax rate 3. A small number of studies have equally looked into the 
joint influence of both the monetary, fiscal and supply side elements such 
as interest rate as well as exchange rate 4. 
However, not much attention has been focussed on the influence of 
food shortage on inflationary pressure while in recent years most developing 
countries especially in Africa have been experiencing burgeoning food im-
port bills. 
In this paper we developed a small model of the interactions between 
the main variables in the price formation which we use to test the hypothe-
sis that inadequate food supply is associated with inflation. The model 
stresses the role of interest rate in the unorganised money market on the 
behaviour of variables such as food and industrial prices. 
The model is estimated by using Nigerian data covering the period 
* Department of Economics, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ue-Ife (Nigeria). 
1 S e e e .g . AGHEVLI a n d KHAN ( 1 9 7 8 ) a n d R o s and VAZQUEZ ( 1 9 8 0 ) . 
2 See e.g. HARBERGER (1963), KHAN (1980), and VOGEL (1974). 
3 See e.g. SUNDARARAJAN (1986). 
4 See DOWNES (1985), and IZE and SALAS (1985). 
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1960-91. Section 2 gives the basic framework of the model. In Section 3 the 
empirical results generated from estimating the model are presented. Final-
ly, in Section 4, appear some concluding remarks. 
2. The Model Equation 
In this section we will present the specification of the model. 
Food. Price. - The rate of change in food prices is assumed to be a function 
of the rate of change in domestic food production Qt, the rate of change of 
food import Mt, rate of change in industrial wages (w), interest rate at the 
unorganised market ru, and flow of credit to the agricultural sector. 
Pfi = PfAQo Mt, ru, Wt, Q (1) 
Rather than using the interest rate in the organised market, we utilize 
the cost of credit in the unorganised market. Generally, farmers have little 
access to formal credit market. It is not clear whether this is because of 
relatively low returns among the farmer borrowers or because of other 
factors such as high administrative costs involved in such lending. Whatever 
the reason, they must rely instead on more expensive informal credit. 
However, time series data on such interest rate are not available in Nigeria, 
we therefore proxied it by 
r - M s b 
" Mj 
where 
ru = ru (r, P;, M2S_V G, F E R ( 2 ) 
MSB is defined as money supply outside the banking system and M2, is the 
money supply broadly defined (CC + DD + TD). The relationship 
between P*0 and ru could be either neutral, negative, or positive since 
an increase in P*0 would normally result in a relatively liberal fiscal and 
monetary policies. An expansionary monetary policy is expected to result 
in a fall in ru while a contractionary fiscal policy would result in a rise in r . 
Hence, the impact of an increased P* can be positive, negative, or neutral. 
We expect the unorganised market rate (ru) to behave like the conventional 
interest rate with respect to foreign interest rate r , money supply broadly 
defined lagged one period M2_1 and G, government expenditure. 
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Industrial Wages. - The industrial wages is specified to depend on the rate 
of change in the cost of living index (L), industrial output YN and inverse 
of the beginning of the period unemployment rate lagged one period Uz\-
W = W (L, Yn, U~lx) (3) 
The expectation is that L and YN will have increasing effect on W. We 
expect the U~_\ variable to have positive impact on the wage rate. 
Industrial Prices. - The industrial price equation is made a function of the 
rate of change in wages (Wt), rate of change of non oil output production 
(YN), rate of change in the Naira price of imported intermediate inputs 
(ePint), and the rate of change in the organised and unorganised market 
rate | 1 + ^ | 
I IOOJ 
Pt = Pt[w„ YN, ePint, l + i y (4) 
Realistically, the wholesale price index is a linear combination of its dif-
ferent components with fixed weights. As the wholesale price index is not 
computed in Nigeria, we assume that it can be approximated by a linear 
combination, of four of its components namely rate of change in food prices, 
rate of change in agricultural prices, rate of change in prices of industrial 
goods and rate of change in prices of imported inputs 
Pw = axPfl + a2Pax + a}P!t + a4Pmt (5) 
The model is closed with an equation which assumed that there is 
some kind of mark up from wholesale prices to retail prices. And if the 
mark-up is proportional to the wholesale price, it means that the sum of the 
parameters must be unity. 
Pt = Pt(Pw> Pw-i> Pw-2> Pw-i> (6) 
Equation 6 assumes that the rate of change in the cost of living index -
retail price index is a distributed lag of the rate of change in the wholesale 
price. 
3. Empirical Results 
Empirical results for equations (1) to (6) estimated on the basis of 
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TABLE 1 
F O O D S U P P L Y A N D I N F L A T I O N : T H E E S T I M A T E D R E S U L T S 
Pfi = 2.31 
(2.16) 
- 0.36Q, 
( - 0 . 8 6 ) 
+ 0.15AÍ, 
(2.14) 
+ 0.69r„ + 0.021*7,+ 0.26Cr  
(3.15) (1.23) (2.13) 
Dw = 1.934 R2 = 0.72 SEE = 0.032 
ru = 3.02 
(4.12) 
0.08 P* 
( - 1 . 0 6 ) 
+ 0.16r* 
(0.49) 
2.14Afj_i— 0.09G - 2.14FER_ 1  
( - 2 . 1 4 ) (2.63) (2.10) 
DW = 1.699 R2 = 0.69 SEE = 0.142 




+ 0.03 U l } 
(0.14) 
4- 0 .02Y n  
(0.12) 
DW = 2.102 R2 = 0.77 SEE = 0.013 
p, = 3.17 
(2.74) 
0.04 W, 
( - 0 . 5 2 ) 
- 0.52 Y N  
(2.14) 
+ 0.48eP inl + 2.13 i l + - A - Ì 
V 100 J 
(3.41) (3.14) 
DW = 1.936 R2 = 0.75 SEE = 0.413 
Pu, = 0.39P / ;  
(3.14) 




+ 0.25 Pint  
(2.01) 
D.W. = 1.7231 SEE = 0.002 






l + 0 . 1 7 P „ _ 2 + 0 .13P „_3 
(2.12) (1.82) 
DW = 2.214 R2 = 0.836 SEE = 0.031 
annual data for Nigeria are as shown in Table 1. Equations 1 to (6) except 
(5) constitute a simultaneous system that is linear in variables. Thus equa-
tions (1) to (4) and (6) were estimated using the two stage least squares 
method. Equation (5) is not structural and is therefore estimated by ordina-
ry least squares. 
From equation (1) to (6), the information provided by the adjusted 
values of the coefficients of multiple determination (R2), Durbin-Watson 
statistic {DW) and standard error of regression suggest that the equations 
are adequate representations of the data. The R2 ranges from 0.69 for 
unorganised market rate to 0.836 for the cost of living equation. The Dur-
bin Watson statistic ranges between 1.699 in the equation for unorganised 
market rate to 2.214 in the cost of living equation. The most important 
features of the empirical results are discussed below 
The sum of the coefficients in equation (5) is 0.97; therefore for a 1 
per cent point increase in the rate of growth of food prices, industrial prices, 
agricultural prices and imported raw materials prices, the wholesale price 
index measured as the GDP deflator will increase by about 0.97%. 
The result shows that the rate of change in the price of food is an 
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important factor in the determination of change in the wholesale prices. For 
a 1 % point increase in the rate of growth of food price, the direct effect is 
0.39 point increase in the growth of wholesale price. This in turn will affect 
the rate of change in the cost of living through equations (5) and (6). This 
result, in conformity with the structuralist theory, tends to suggest that 
inflation is propagated through increase in food price. 
From the equations, a steady growth of Y% in wholesale prices would 
generate a rate of growth of 0.85 + 0.042 in the cost of living. A possible 
inference from this is that wages might be moving faster than the wholesale 
price in other sectors not included in our model. 
The rate of change in money supply broadly defined, unorganised 
market rate, and rate of credit supply to the agricultural sector are important 
factors in the explanation of the rate of change in food price. For a 1% 
point increase in the rate of interest in the unorganised market, the direct 
effect is 0.69 point increase in the rate of growth of food price. The 
corresponding values in relation to money supply and credit supply are 
0.15 and 0.26 per cent respectively. 
The equation for unorganised market rate of interest (equation 2) 
shows that the rate of growth of money supply, foreign exchange reserves 
lagged one period and government expenditures are significant determinants 
of the unorganised market rate. Foreign interest rates have no discernible 
effect on the rates in the unorganised market in Nigeria, while foreign price 
of oil tends to depress unorganised market rates. This tends to suggest that 
government adopted expansionary monetary and fiscal policies for most of 
the period under review. However, this is a very weak tendency. 
The coefficient of the cost of living in the wage equation (3) came out 
with a significant positive sign. The elasticity 0.67 tends to suggest that the 
labour market structure is such that money wages do not adjust instanta-
neously to maintain a consistent rate of change in real wages for a given 
excess demand even in a country experiencing a high inflation rate. Also, 
the moderating impact of unemployment in wage demand is obvious: the 
inverse of the beginning of period unemployment rate shows up with a 
significant positive sign. Non oil output production has no discernible effect 
on wages. 
In the industrial price equation, wages exert no noticeable pressure. 
There is a strong and quick response to change in the Naira price of 
intermediate raw materials ePint. This considerably complicate exchange 
rates management, because the exchange rate is a component of the Naira 
price of intermediate raw materials. Turning to the cost of credit variable, 
the result shows that the unorganised market rate has a strong impact on 
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industrial price. This result is quite consistent with our expectation that 
unorganised market rates play a large role in financing industrial production 
in Nigeria. This result seems to show that we have a downward sloping 
supply curve for non oil goods; the coefficient of YN in the industrial price 
equation is negative ( - 0.52). This result may indicate gross underutilisation 
of installed capacity. 
In a nutshell, our empirical analysis points to the importance of food 
shortage, Naira-price of intermediate raw materials and unorganised market 
rates in generating and fuelling inflation in Nigeria. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The results of our analysis suggest that specific policies be undertaken 
to increase food supply in Nigeria as this is found to be a major factor in 
triggering inflationary cycles. This result has implications for the current 
macro economic policies being articulated in Nigeria to stem the rate of 
inflation. Macro economic policies such as credit control, monetary and 
fiscal policies will achieve little result in the presence of inadequate food 
supply. Otherwise, the situation may lead to increase malnutrition and pov-
erty among the people. So, consideration may usefully be given to increase 
food production to complement orthodox stabilisation policies aimed at 
containing inflation in Nigeria. 
APPENDIX 
Sources of Data 
Source A: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Various issues of International Financial Statistics, 
Supplement on prices, Supplement on output 
Source B: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, Various issues of Annual Reports and Statement of 
Accounts and Economic and Financial Review 
Source C: FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS, Various Issues of Annual Abstract of Statistics 
and Digest of Statistics 
Source D: FAO, Various Issues of Production Yearbook Statistics 
Description of Variables 
Pft = food price index 
Qt = rate of change of domestic food production 
M¡ = rate of change in food import 
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ru = interest rate in the unorganised market 
w, = rate of change in industrial wages (proxied by manufacturing wage index) 
Cr = credit supply to the agricultural sector 
* r = foreign interest rate 
K = price of oil 
M] = money supply broadly defined 
G = government expenditure 
FER ! = foreign exchange reserves lagged one period 
Yn = rate of change in non oil output 
UI } = inverse of the beginning of period unemployment rate lagged one period 
Pt = industrial price 
(1 + rj 100) = interest rate in both organised and unorganised markets 
"Pint = Naira price of imported intermediate inputs 
Pu, = wholesale price index (proxied by the gross domestic product deflator) 
Pf. = rate of change in food prices 
PN = rate of change in agricultural prices 
Pit = rate of change in industrial prices 
p. 'int = rate of change in prices of imported inputs 
K = rate of change in the cost of living index — retail price index 
P , P •> 
w—l> w — 2 
and Pw_j = wholesale lagged values 
MSB = money supply outside the banking system 
Mj_ ! = money supply broadly defined lagged one period 
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OFFERTA DI GENERI ALIMENTARI E INFLAZIONE IN NIGERIA: UN 
APPROCCIO CON EQUAZIONI SIMULTANEE 
La letteratura sulla dinamica dell'inflazione non ha dato molta attenzione 
all'influenza della scarsità di generi alimentari sulla pressione inflazionistica men-
tre in questi ultimi anni nella maggior parte dei paesi in via di sviluppo, special-
mente africani, la spesa per importazioni di generi alimentari è aumentata mol-
tissimo. In questo articolo viene sviluppato un modello delle interazioni fra le 
principali variabili nella formazione dei prezzi per verificare l'ipotesi che un'of-
ferta inadeguata di generi alimentari è associata ad inflazione. Il modello — che 
usa dati della Nigeria per il periodo 1960-91 — sottolinea il ruolo del saggio 
d'interesse nel mercato monetario non organizzato sul comportamento di variabili 
come i prezzi dei generi alimentari e industriali. I risultati dell'analisi suggerisco-
no che si adottino adeguate politiche per aumentare l'offerta di generi alimentari 
in Nigeria poiché risulta che questo sia un fattore importantissimo nel determina-
re cicli inflazionistici. 
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S I N T E S I D E L L ' 
GENE 
L'ASSICURATORE 
L'attività del Gruppo. Il Gruppo Generali prosegue nella po-
litica di rafforzamento delie proprie posizioni nei diversi mer-
cati di operazione, muovendosi lungo tre direttrici: riorganiz-
zazione e razionalizzazione della presenza nei paesi di più an-
tico insediamento; ingresso in nuovi territori che presentano 
interessanti potenzialità di crescita; proseguimento della po-
litica imprenditoriale finalizzata alla crescita degli affari as-
sicurativi attraverso accordi di ampia portata con importanti 
gruppi internazionali, supportata anche dall'acquisizione di 
qualificate partecipazioni azionarie di minoranza. 
Rientrano in questo quadro gli accordi con il Banco Central 
Hispano di Madrid, con il Gruppo Fiat, nonché l'acquisizio-
ne del 3% del capitale della Banca Commerciale Italiana e 
la concentrazione della partecipazione nel Banco Ambro-
siano Veneto presso la controllata Alleanza Assicurazioni. 
Per quanto più direttamente attiene al potenziamento del-
le strutture del Gruppo nei diversi territori, le operazioni 
più recenti hanno riguardato la riorganizzazione della pre-
senza in Germania, Belgio e Argentina, la costituzione di 
nuove società in Portogallo e a Guernsey, l'inizio delle ope-
razioni in Romania e nella Repubblica Ceca, il rafforza-
mento della presenza in America Latina: in quest'area il 
Gruppo ha infatti acquisito il controllo di una compagnia in 
Ecuador, ha rafforzato la propria presenza in Perù, dando 
vita a una nuova controllata che si pone al secondo posto 
sul mercato, ha acquisito un'importante compagnia in Co-
lombia e ha costituito una società in Argentina destinata a 
gestire l'attività nel campo dei fondi pensione. 
ATTIVO (In milioni di lire) 1993 1992 
Beni Immobili 10.445.896 9.850.122 
Titoli a reddito fisso 48.282.042 37.629.752 
Azioni e partecipazioni 10.559.561 8.918.159 
Prestiti 4.470.835 3.813.236 
Depositi di riassicurazione 711.164 757.034 
Depositi bancari 4.085.556 3.750.037 
Debitori diversi e altri attivi 9.215.736 8.296.748 
T o t a l e att ivo 87.770.790 73.015.088 
PASSIVO (in milioni di lire) 
Accantonamenti 
per impegni assicurativi 68.345.834 56.415.009 
Depositi di riassicurazione 817.840 715.470 
Altri passivi 7.280.410 4.834.352 
Ouote di terzi 2.377.046 2.219.121 
Patrimonio netto 8.339.515 8.256.114 
U t i l e d e l l ' e s e r c i z i o 610.145 575.022 
T o t a l e p a s s i v o 87.770.790 7 3 . 0 1 5 . 0 8 8 
• Sono state consolidate 86 compagnie di assicurazione operanti in una qua-
rantina di mercati, 28 finanziarie, 21 immobiliari e 3 agricole. 
• L'utile d'esercizio è stato di 686,1 miliardi, a fronte di 676,7 miliardi dell'an-
no precedente; sul risultato hanno gravato per 161,4 miliardi le modifiche ap-
portate ad alcuni criteri contabili, nonché 
imposte per un ammontare doppio rispet-
to a quello del 1992. La quota dell'utile 
consolidato di pertinenza della Capogrup-
po è di 610,1 miliardi contro i 675 miliardi 
dell'esercizio precedente. 
• I premi consolidati ammontano a 
24.873,2 miliardi (+10,9%). Essi proven-
gono per il 76,9% dai Paesi dell'Unione 
Europea (Italia 30%), per il 16,1% dagli 
altri Paesi europei, per il restante 7% dai 
Paesi extraeuropei. I premi raccolti nel 
ramo vita sono pari a 9.985,9 miliardi 
(+9%), nei rami danni a 14.887,3 miliar-
di (+12,3%). 
• Per prestazioni assicurative sono stati 
effettuati pagamenti per 12.938,8 miliardi. 
• Gli accantonamenti per impegni assi-
curativi sono aumentati di 11.930 miliardi. 
• I costi di produzione e di amministrazione sono ammontati a 6.006,5 mi-
liardi. L'incidenza dei costi sui premi è risultata del 27,3%, in linea con il pre-
cedente esercizio. 
• Gli investimenti sono saliti a 78.655,1 miliardi contro i 64.718,3 miliardi 
del 1992 (+21,4%), con accantonamenti per impegni assicurativi pari a 
68.345,8 miliardi. 
• I redditi degli investimenti hanno raggiunto i 6.323,4 miliardi contro i 
5.329,9 miliardi del 1992 (+18,6%). 
• Il patrimonio netto complessivo risulta di 10.640,5 miliardi, di cui il 78,4% 
è di pertinenza della Capogruppo. 
Il Gruppo Generali, oltre che in Ital ia , opera in Argentina, 
Austria, Belgio, Brasi le, Canada , Colombia, Danimarca, 
Ecuador, Emirat i Arabi, Franc ia , Germania, Giappone, 
Gibilterra, Gran Bretagna, Grecia, Guatemala, Guernsey, 
Hong Kong, Irlanda, Israele , Libano, Lussemburgo, Malta, 
Messico, Olanda, Panama, Perù, Portogallo, Principato di 
Monaco, Repubblica Ceca, Romania, San Marino, Singapore, 
Spagna, Stati Uniti, Sud Africa, Svizzera, Turchia, Ungheria. 
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RALI 
SENZA FRONTIERE. 
L'attività della Capogruppo. La Compagnia ha proseguito 
la propria politica volta al miglioramento dei risultati tecni-
ci, attraverso una duplice azione indirizzata al risanamento 
del portafoglio assicurativo e al contenimento dei costi di ge-
stione. Tale azione è stata condotta con particolare incisi-
vità sul mercato italiano da! quale proviene il 55% del volu-
me d'affari complessivo e il 70% del lavoro diretto. L'adozio-
ne di una politica assuntiva attenta e selettiva e gli inter-
venti di riforma del portafoglio in atto da tre anni, ma ulte-
riormente accentuati nel decorso esercizio, hanno permesso 
di conseguire una sensibile riduzione del rapporto sinistri a 
premi dei rami danni: grazie al contemporaneo rallenta-
mento dell'incidenza dei costi, diminuita ancora di un punto 
percentuale, il risultato della gestione tecnica in Italia si è -







Premi netti 8.551.509 7.770.655 
Redditi netti degli investimenti 
Interessi tecnici gestione vita 
Risultato della gestione tecnica 









Saldo del la gest ione ordinar ia 173.481 255.367 
Profitti da alienazione di titoli ed immobil 
Utili di cambio 
Minusvalenze da valutazione di titoli 









Saldo del la gest ione s t r a o r d i n a r i a 507.243 283.908 
Imposte sul risultato 260.354 - 149.487 
Utile del l'eserciz io 420.370 389.788 
• L'utile d'esercizio è di 420,4 miliardi, contro 389,8 miliardi dell'esercizio 
precedente. Sul risultato ha gravato, per oltre 110 miliardi, l'effetto di talune 
modifiche apportate ai criteri contabili. 
• I premi ammontano a 9.776,4 miliardi, contro gli 8.804,2 miliardi del 1992, 
di cui 3.850,3 miliardi riferiti all'assicurazione vita e 5.926,1 ai rami danni. 
Compagnie del Gruppo Generali in Italia: AdriaVita, Agricoltura, Al-
leanza, AssiBa, Aurora, Friuli-Venezia Giulia "La Cantica", La Ve-
nezia, Navale, SIAD, Trieste e Venezia, Risparmio Assicurazioni, 
Risparmio Vita, Unione Mediterranea di Sicurtà, Europ Assistance. 
per la prima volta dopo molti anni - avvicinato nuovamente 
al pareggio; ancora di segno negativo è per contro l'anda-
mento del lavoro estero e della riassicurazione. Anche sul 
versante della gestione patrimoniale e finanziaria sono stati 
conseguiti risultati soddisfacenti, con una vivace crescita dei 
redditi correnti e - in presenza di un minor apporto rispetto 
all'esercizio precedente di operazioni straordinarie - con 
consistenti utili conseguiti nell'ambito dell'attività di trading 
svolta sulle principali piazze borsistiche internazionali. 
In questo quadro, l'utile netto del bilancio 1993 è risultato 
superiore di oltre 30 miliardi a quello del 1992, e ciò dopo 
che talune modifiche ai criteri contabili hanno gravato il 
conto economico per 110 miliardi e dopo l'assorbimento di 
maggiori imposte per altri 111 miliardi. 
• Per prestazioni assicurative sono stati 
effettuati pagamenti per 4.906 miliardi. 
• Gli accantonamenti per impegni assicu-
rativi sono aumentati di 3.624,8 miliardi. 
• I costi di produzione e di amministra-
zione sono ammontati a 2.132,4 miliardi. 
L'incidenza dei costi sui premi è diminui-
ta nel lavoro diretto italiano dal 24% del 
1992 al 23%. 
• Gli investimenti sono saliti a 30.690,7 
miliardi contro i 25.768,9 miliardi del 
1992 (+19,1%). 
• I redditi degli investimenti hanno rag-
giunto i 2.481,6 miliardi contro i 2.121,3 
miliardi del 1992 (+17%). 
• II patrimonio netto raggiunge i 6.567,8 
miliardi. L'eccedenza rispetto al fabbiso-
gno minimo del margine di solvibilità è 
di 2.323 miliardi nel ramo vita e di 2.252,4 miliardi nei rami danni. 
• Il dividendo, al lordo delle ritenute di legge, è di Lit. 360 per azione. 
• In sede di Assemblea straordinaria gii azionisti hanno approvato la propo-
sta d'aumento gratuito del capitale sociale da Lue 1.467,500 miliardi a Lire 
1.603,250 miliardi mediante assegnazione di una azione nuova - godimento 
1° gennaio 1994 - per ogni gruppo di dieci azioni vecchie possedute. 
> Presidente-Amministratore Delegato Eugenio Coppola di Canzano; Vice-
presidenti Antoine Bernheim e Francesco Cingano; Amministratore Delegato 
Gianfranco Gutty. 
GRUPPO 
GENERALI L ' A S S I C U R A T O R E S E N Z A F R O N T I E R E . 
Oxford University Press is pleased to announce that it is now publishing 
The China Quarterly 
For over thirty years The China Quarterly has published high-quality 
research on every aspect of modern China. Today it continues to provide 
the authoritative and thought-provoking perspectives on which China 
watchers have come to rely. The China Quarterly has an international 
circulation that includes diplomats, journalists, scholars and the business 
community. The China Quarterly is the leading interdisciplinary journal on 
the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Macao, and Hong Kong. From 
politics and international affairs, economics and commerce, geography and 
demography, to arts and literature. The China Quarterly offers: 
Articles: carefully researched and published according to the highest academic 
standards after close scrutiny by specialists in the field. 
Analysis: briefing analyses on recent developments keep readers up to date with 
current events. 
Research notes: on specific topics of scholarly interest which appeal to a wider 
audience. 
Essays: on new concepts and methods in Chinese studies. 
Surveys: which describe and assess research on China in various countries and 
academic disciplines. 
Special issues: devoted to a theme provide comprehensive analysis of key topics. 
Chronicle and Documentation section: offers a valuable overview of recent events 
in China and reactions thereto, both domestic and foreign. 
Translations: occasional translations of important Chinese documents. 
Book reviews: complete with a listing of books received, provides a reliable and 
up to date guide of new publications in the field of Chinese studies. 
Orders for subscriptions may be placed by post, telephone or fax using any major 
credit card with: 
Oxford University Press Tel: (+44) (0) 865 56767 
Journals Marketing (CQX) Fax: (+44) (0) 865 26777: 
Walton Street 
Oxford 0X2 6DP 
United Kingdom 
Subscription rates for 1994 volumes 137-140 (4 issues) 
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